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INTRODUCTION 
The period since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 has 
witnessed the implementation of aggressive counter–terrorism measures 
around much of the Western world. This trend is exemplified by the United 
States and the United Kingdom, the two jurisdictions with which this 
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Article is concerned. Many of these counterterrorism measures raise 
questions about the appropriate boundaries of state power and have serious 
implications for individual liberty. As affected individuals brought 
litigation, the United States Supreme Court and the United Kingdom’s 
House of Lords, the highest courts in their respective jurisdictions,1 were 
forced to grapple with these difficult issues.  
This Article is an attempt to situate the major decisions of the Supreme 
Court and the House of Lords concerning aspects of the War on Terror in 
the historical context of judicial behavior in times of war or crisis. The 
conventional account of judicial behavior during such times posits that 
courts are ineffective guarantors of individual liberty because they 
inevitably defer to executive claims of national security. Only after the 
period of war has passed do the courts reassert themselves, resulting in a 
cyclical pattern of contraction and expansion of liberty.2  
How do the relevant post–9/11 decisions of the Supreme Court and 
House of Lords fit within this pattern, if at all? This Article considers five 
possible ways of understanding the relevant decisions in light of the 
conventional account of judicial behavior described above. First, the 
decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords since 9/11 may 
represent a break in the historical pattern of judicial deference. Second, the 
conventional account may simply be incorrect or incomplete. Three further 
explanations are largely consistent with the conventional account. First, 
these cases may be sufficiently remote in time from the relevant events such 
that courts feel confident in reasserting their authority. Second, the courts 
may view the War on Terror as being in some way qualitatively different 
from traditional war. The final explanation is that the relevant post–9/11 
decisions, while appearing to be different, continue to exhibit deference in a 
manner consistent with the conventional account.  
Part I of this Article sets out the conventional account in greater detail, 
together with supporting decisions from each jurisdiction. Part II outlines 
the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords that have 
concerned aspects of the War on Terror. Part III provides an extended 
discussion of the five possible ways of reconciling the conventional account 
with the recent decisions. Part IV draws some conclusions as to the most 
pertinent explanations.  
I. THE CONVENTIONAL ACCOUNT AND ITS BASIS 
During times of emergency, those charged with protecting national 
security and public safety have exhibited a historical tendency to overreact. 
  
 1. In October 2009, the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom replaced the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. 
 2. This idea is encapsulated in the Latin maxim that appears in the title (“In the 
midst of war, the law falls silent”). 
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As Laurence Lustgarten and Ian Leigh state, “official responses to 
emergencies which were overwhelmingly viewed at the time as not merely 
justifiable but compelling, have consistently turned out to be excessive, 
unnecessary, and often shameful.”3 Allied with this phenomenon, according 
to the conventional account of judicial behavior in times of war and crisis, is 
the ineffectiveness of the courts in checking the excesses of the executive 
because they tend to defer to executive claims of national security.4  
According to Lord Steyn, deference “refers to the idea of a court, 
exceptionally, out of respect for other branches of government and in 
recognition of their democratic decision-making role, declining to make its 
own independent judgment on a particular issue.”5 Similarly, Aileen 
Kavanagh states that deference is where “judges assign varying degrees of 
weight to the judgment of the elected branches, out of respect for their 
superior competence, expertise and/or democratic legitimacy.”6 
 There are two main reasons why the courts are reluctant to get involved 
in cases involving national security, and thus have a tendency to defer in 
such matters. The first concern is that it is not constitutionally appropriate 
for the judiciary to deal with such issues, and that proper recourse in such a 
policy-driven area lies with the political branches.7 The second concern is 
practical. Courts may lack the information needed to determine the case and 
  
 3. LAURENCE LUSTGARTEN & IAN LEIGH, IN FROM THE COLD 19 (1994). 
 4. See Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be 
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1034 (2003) (“Notwithstanding statements about the 
courts’ role in safeguarding human rights and civil liberties precisely when those rights and 
liberties are most at risk, when faced with national crises, the judiciary tends to ‘go[ ] to 
war.’”); Joseph W. Bishop, Jr., Law in the Control of Terrorism and Insurrection: The 
British Laboratory Experience, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 140, 187 (1978) (“[I]t is more 
instructive to look at what the courts do than at what they say; in England, as in the United 
States, they have not been disposed straitly to confine the powers granted the executive by 
statute in what they perceive as a real emergency.”); CONOR GEARTY, CIVIL LIBERTIES 188 
(2007) (“[A]ny answer to these points must take into account . . . the historically very bad 
record of the entire judiciary in protecting civil liberties in the face of executive and 
parliamentary action. The lesson of the past is that it is delusional to rely on judges to lead on 
in the hard work of civil libertarian protection.”) [hereinafter GEARTY, CIVIL LIBERTIES]; 
DAVID DYZENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTION OF LAW 17 (2006) (“[T]he judicial record in 
enforcing the rule of law in [emergency] situations is at worst dismal, at best ambiguous.”). 
See also Eyal Benvenisti, National Courts and the “War on Terrorism,” in ENFORCING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW NORMS AGAINST TERRORISM 307, 309–17 (Andrea Bianchi ed., 2004); 
David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times of 
Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2568–71 (2003) [hereinafter Cole, Judging the Next 
Emergency]. 
 5. Lord Steyn, Deference: A Tangled Story P.L. 346, 349 (2005). 
 6. AILEEN KAVANAGH, CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW UNDER THE UK HUMAN RIGHTS 
ACT 169 (2009). See also Daniel J. Solove, The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial 
Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV. 941, 948 (1999) (describing the principle of 
deference as the idea that “judges should not second-guess the decisionmaker under review 
or impose their own judgments about the wisdom of a policy.”). 
 7. LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, at 329. 
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face difficulties with maintaining the secrecy of sensitive information given 
the adversarial process.8 Whatever the precise reasons behind this judicial 
reticence with regard to national security, there is certainly a corpus of 
judicial decisions in each jurisdiction that forms the basis of the 
conventional account.9 These cases are discussed further below. 
A. The United States 
In 1798, in the context of a looming war with France and bitter political 
and ideological division between the Federalists and Republicans, the 
Federalist–controlled Congress enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts.10  The 
Alien Acts authorized the President to detain and expel any alien he 
considered a threat to the United States as well as any enemy alien during a 
declared war.11 The Sedition Act criminalized “false, scandalous and 
malicious writing” critical of the government, Congress or the President.12 
This Act became a weapon to silence political dissent from the Francophile 
Republicans.13 
The judges who heard cases involving the Sedition Act, including three 
Supreme Court Justices on circuit, upheld it.14 However, the Act turned 
public sentiments against the Federalists, and the Republicans swept into 
power in the 1800 elections.15 The newly elected President Jefferson 
pardoned those convicted under the Act; Congress later repaid the fines 
imposed under the Act with interest.16 The Supreme Court itself later stated 
that “the attack upon [the Act’s] validity has carried the day in the court of 
history.”17 
During the Civil War, President Lincoln authorized significant 
restrictions on civil liberties. Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, for 
  
 8. Id. See also KAVANAGH, supra note 6, at 211–13. 
 9. See generally George J. Alexander, The Illusory Protection of Human Rights by 
National Courts During Periods of Emergency, 5 HUM. RTS. L.J. 1, 10–32 (1984); Daniel C. 
Kramer, The Courts as Guardians of Fundamental Freedoms in Times of Crisis, 2 
UNIVERSAL HUM. RTS. 1, 3–9 (1980).  
 10. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES 25-29 (2004). 
 11. Alien Friends Act, ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570 (1798) (expired in 1800); Alien Enemies 
Act, ch. 66, 1 Stat. 577 (1798) (Act remains in force). See 50 U.S.C. §§ 21–24 (2006). 
 12. Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1798) (expired in 1800). 
 13. STONE, supra note 10, at 33–38. 
 14. William J. Brennan, Jr., The Quest to Develop a Jurisprudence of Civil Liberties 
in Times of Security Crises, 18 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 11, 12–13 (1988). The Supreme Court, 
however, had yet to assert the power of judicial review. See Arthur H. Garrison, The Internal 
Security Acts of 1798: The Founding Generation and the Judiciary during America’s First 
National Security Crisis, 34 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 1, 24 (2009). 
 15. STONE, supra note 10, at 71. 
 16. Id. at 73. 
 17. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). See also Communist 
Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 155 (1961) (Black, 
J., dissenting). 
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which he later obtained legislative sanction, resulted in the military 
detention of some 20,000 persons suspected of being sympathetic to the 
South.18 Some of these persons were simply detained without trial, while 
others were tried before military tribunals.19 In a rare judicial decision that 
attempted to restrain the executive in a time of war, Chief Justice Taney, 
sitting as a circuit judge, ruled Lincoln’s suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus unconstitutional on the basis that only Congress had the power to 
suspend the writ.20 Despite this, Lincoln paid little heed to Taney’s 
decision.21 
The most famous Supreme Court decision to come out of the Civil War 
was Ex parte Milligan, where the Court ruled that civilians in Indiana could 
not be tried by military tribunal.22 Milligan was accused of being part of the 
Sons of Liberty, a rebel group that had undermined the Union war effort. He 
was arrested by the military, tried and convicted before a military tribunal, 
and then sentenced to death. The Court ruled unanimously that the military 
tribunal lacked the jurisdiction to try a civilian such as Milligan.23 However, 
the Court divided on the reason for this outcome. Five Justices were of the 
view that due process dictated the result.24 The remaining four were of the 
view that the problem was a lack of proper Congressional authorization.25 
The period around World War I witnessed the prosecution of many anti-
war agitators and socialists for adopting positions opposing the war effort.26 
In a series of cases, the Supreme Court upheld the convictions of these 
radicals under the Espionage Act of 1917.27 In 1919, the Court decided 
Schenck v. United States.28 The defendants in Schenck had been convicted 
of conspiring to violate the Espionage Act by distributing leaflets that urged 
draftees to resist the draft. The leaflets in question argued that the draft was 
illegal, immoral and only benefited capitalists.29 Justice Holmes, writing for 
a unanimous Court, enunciated the notable “clear and present danger” test, 
but upheld the defendants’ convictions. Justice Holmes stated that free 
speech protection was necessarily different during a time of war, and 
  
 18. Frederic Block, Civil Liberties During National Emergencies: The Interactions 
Between the Three Branches of Government in Coping with Past and Current Threats to the 
Nation’s Security, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 459, 482–83 (2005). 
 19. Brennan, supra note 14, at 13. 
 20. Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 149 (1861).  
 21. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME 38 (1998). 
 22. 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
 23. Id. at 122. 
 24. Id. at 120–21. 
 25. Id. at 137 (Chase, C.J., dissenting). 
 26. See Mark Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME 
124, 126 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005) [hereinafter Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?]. 
 27. Ch. 30, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (repealed 1948). 
 28. 249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
 29. Id. at 50–51. 
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rejected the argument that the leaflets were protected by the First 
Amendment: 
When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time of peace 
are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be endured so 
long as men fight and that no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right.30  
The Court continued to uphold convictions under the Espionage Act for 
similar speech-based acts in decisions such as Debs v. United States,31 and 
Abrams v. United States,32 which considered the Act after its amendment by 
the Sedition Act of 1918.33 Justice Holmes wrote for a unanimous Court in 
Debs, but penned a famous dissent in Abrams.34 He was joined in dissent by 
Justice Brandeis, but their view of the First Amendment remained a 
minority one into the 1920s,35 and only became the mainstream view many 
decades later.36 
World War II provided further instances of judicial acquiescence towards 
draconian executive measures. The case of Ex parte Quirin arose out of a 
group of eight Nazi saboteurs who landed on the east coast of the United 
States in June 1942.37 They arrived wearing German military uniforms, 
which they buried at the beach before continuing on in civilian clothing. All 
were quickly captured by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, partly 
because one of the saboteurs turned himself in.38 President Roosevelt 
directed that the saboteurs be tried by military commission and denied 
access to civilian courts.39 The saboteurs petitioned the Supreme Court, 
arguing that they were entitled to be tried in civilian court. The Court, after 
convening a special term, heard the case in July 1942.40 It rejected all the 
saboteurs’ claims, but did not issue a full opinion until October. By this time 
all of the saboteurs had been tried and found guilty by the military 
commission; six of them had already been executed.41 Given this fait 
accompli, the Court’s full decision unsurprisingly upheld the trial of the 
saboteurs by military commission. Writing some sixty years later, Justice 
  
 30. Id. at 52. 
 31. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).  
 32. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
 33. Ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553 (repealed 1921). 
 34. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 35. See, e.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); see, e.g., Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927). 
 36. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
 37. 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942). 
 38. Michal R. Belknap, The Supreme Court Goes to War: The Meaning and 
Implications of the Nazi Saboteur Case, 89 MIL. L. REV. 59, 62–64 (1980). See also LOUIS 
FISHER, MILITARY TRIBUNALS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 93 (2005). 
 39. Belknap, supra note 38, at 65. 
 40. Id. at 69. 
 41. Id. at 77. 
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Scalia observed that Quirin “was not [the Supreme Court’s] finest hour.”42 
Others have offered even harsher critique.43 
The most notorious instance of an abridgment of civil liberties from 
World War II, however, was the Japanese internment. President Roosevelt’s 
Executive Order 9066,44 together with supporting legislation subsequently 
enacted by Congress,45 formed the legal basis for the forced evacuation and 
eventual internment of more than 110,000 people of Japanese heritage, most 
of them American citizens.46 The majority were detained in ten internment 
camps behind barbed wire and guard towers for three years, despite the 
absence of any documented instance of sabotage or disloyalty on the part of 
a Japanese person living in the United States.47 
Aspects of the internment were challenged in a series of cases. In 
Hirabayashi v. United States,48 the Court considered the legality of a dusk–
to–dawn curfew imposed on “all alien Japanese, all alien Germans, all alien 
Italians, and all persons of Japanese ancestry” residing in a defined area.49 
Hirabayashi launched a test case by deliberately violating the curfew. He 
was prosecuted and convicted for knowingly disregarding restrictions of a 
military commander in a military area.50 The Court unanimously upheld his 
conviction. Although a number of the Justices were troubled by the case, the 
Court ultimately deferred to the executive on a matter relating to war: 
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the 
exercise of the war power in all the vicissitudes and conditions of warfare, 
it has necessarily given them wide scope for the exercise of judgment and 
discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or 
danger and in the selection of the means for resisting it. . . . Where, as they 
did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and discretion 
and for the choice of means by those branches of the Government on 
which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of warmaking, it is not 
for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its 
judgment for theirs.51 
  
 42. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 569 (2004). 
 43. See Belknap, supra note 38, at 95 (accusing the Court of falling “into step with 
the drums of war.”). 
 44. 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942). 
 45. National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. No. 77–501–503, § 56, Stat. 173 (1942), 
repealed by P.L. No. 94–412 § 501(e), 90 Stat. 1255 (1976). 
 46. See JENNIFER ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, DETENTION OF AMERICAN 
CITIZENS AS ENEMY COMBATANTS, 21–22 (Mar. 31, 2005), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL317 24.pdf. 
 47. STONE, supra note 10, at 287. 
 48. 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
 49. Id. at 88. 
 50. Id. at 83. 
 51. Id. at 93. 
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The Court was again confronted with the internment in Korematsu v. 
United States.52 Korematsu defied the military’s order to leave his 
California home;53 he was subsequently arrested and convicted of remaining 
in a military area contrary to a military order that required the exclusion of 
“all persons of Japanese ancestry.”54 The Supreme Court upheld his 
conviction by six to three. Justice Black, writing for the majority, accepted 
the Executive’s claims of military necessity underlying the exclusion of 
Japanese on the American West Coast without question: 
Korematsu was not excluded from the Military Area because of hostility to 
him or his race. He was excluded because we are at war with the Japanese 
Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an 
invasion of our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security 
measures, because they decided that the military urgency of the situation 
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated from the 
West Coast temporarily, and, finally, because Congress, reposing its 
confidence in this time of war in our military leaders—as inevitably it 
must—determined that they should have the power to do just this. There 
was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some, the military authorities 
considered that the need for action was great, and time was short. We 
cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective of hindsight—now 
say that, at that time, these actions were unjustified.55 
The end of World War II was followed by the onset of the Cold War, and 
the focus shifted to the threat of communism. The fear of what was 
perceived as a worldwide communist movement dedicated to overthrowing 
the United States government, together with an unstable and uncertain 
international environment, left the American people with what Geoffrey 
Stone describes as a “pervasive sense of fear”.56 It was in this broader 
context that the Supreme Court decided a number of decisions implicating 
the First Amendment.57 Among these was the Court’s 1951 decision of 
Dennis v. United States,58 which considered the appeals of leaders in the 
  
 52. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The other Supreme Court cases were Yasui v. United 
States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) and Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
 53. He did so for personal reasons: he wanted to remain with his Italian–American 
girlfriend. See STONE, supra note 10, at 299. 
 54. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215–16. 
 55. Id. at 223–24. The claim of military necessity was actually very weak. Even 
before President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066, top military officers had testified 
before a House committee that the probability of attack on the West Coast was virtually zero. 
They also testified that there was no known instance of Japanese residents in Hawaii or the 
West Coast spying for Japan. See STONE, supra note 10, at 295. See also Eric L. Muller, 
Hirabayashi: The Biggest Lie of the Greatest Generation, UNIV. N.C. LEGAL STUDIES 
RESEARCH, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1233682. 
 56. STONE, supra note 10, at 323. 
 57. Id. at 395–423. 
 58. 341 U.S. 494 (1951). 
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Communist Party against their convictions for conspiring to advocate the 
overthrow of the United States, an offence under the Smith Act.59 A 
majority of six Justices upheld the convictions.60 As Stone observes, Dennis 
“involved the direct criminal prosecution of the leaders of Communist Party 
at the height of the nation’s anxiety over Communist subversion.”61 So the 
outcome is perhaps unsurprising. Indeed it was only from 1957—after the 
Korean War, after the death of Stalin, and as McCarthyism waned—that the 
Court’s endorsement of aggressive anti-Communist measures ended.62 
B. The United Kingdom 
During World War I, the Defence of the Realm Acts 1914-1915 
delegated broad powers to the executive branch, allowing it to make 
regulations to secure public safety or the defense of the realm.63  In June 
1915, in order to deal with a perceived threat from those who were not 
technically enemy aliens,64 the government promulgated Regulation 14B 
under the authority of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Act 1914.65 
Regulation 14B permitted the internment of any person of hostile origin or 
association, where the Secretary of State for the Home Department (Home 
Secretary) considered it expedient for securing public safety or defense.66 In 
addition to some 30,000 enemy aliens interned under the exercise of the 
prerogative,67 approximately 160 people were interned under Regulation 
14B’s authority.68  
Regulation 14B was challenged in the case of R v. Halliday, ex parte 
Zadig.69 In Halliday, a majority of the House of Lords ruled that the general 
words of the empowering statute were sufficient to impliedly authorize 
  
 59. Pub. L. No. 670, 54 Stat. 671 (1940). 
 60. Dennis, 341 U.S. 494–95. 
 61. STONE, supra note 10, at 402. 
 62. Id. at 413. 
 63. See Defence of the Realm Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29; Defence of the Realm 
(No. 2) Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5 c. 63, § 1 (Eng.); See Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) 
Act, 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 1 (Eng.). For later Acts, see Cornelius P. Cotter, 
Constitutionalizing Emergency Powers, 5 STAN. L. REV. 382, 387 n. 29 (1952–1953). 
 64. Tom Bingham, Personal Freedom and the Dilemma of Democracies, 52 INT’L & 
COMP. L. Q. 841, 846 (2003). See also Rachel Vorspan, Law and War: Individual Rights, 
Executive Authority, and Judicial Power in England During World War I, 38 VAND. J. 
TRANS. L. 261, 277 (2005). 
 65. 1914, 4 & 5 Geo. 5, c. 29, § 1 (Eng.). 
 66. DAVID BONNER, EXECUTIVE MEASURES, TERRORISM AND NATIONAL SECURITY 53 
(2007); Cotter, supra note 63, at 389. 
 67. LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, at 173; see also Vorspan, supra note 64, at 
277. 
 68. A. W. BRIAN SIMPSON, IN THE HIGHEST DEGREE ODIOUS 17 (1992). 
 69. R v. Halliday, ex parte Zadig, [1917] A.C. 260 (Eng.) [hereinafter Halliday]; see 
also David Foxton, R. v. Halliday ex parte Zadig, in Retrospect, 119 L.Q. REV. 455, 455 
(2003). 
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Regulation 14B, hence justifying the detention of Zadig, a naturalized 
British citizen of German descent.70 Lord Shaw, in dissent, argued that if 
Parliament had intended to delegate such sweeping power to the executive, 
it would surely have done so more overtly. In Lord Shaw’s view, clear and 
express words in the empowering statute were required.71 To not require 
clear, specific statutory authorization was to casually “imply the repeal of 
laws and liberties fundamental to British citizenship.”72 
Immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities in World War II, 
Parliament enacted the Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939.73 Like its 
World War I predecessors, this Act delegated power to the executive to 
make regulations that appeared necessary for a number of purposes 
including public safety, the defense of the realm, and the efficient 
prosecution of the war; once again, the delegation of power essentially gave 
the executive carte blanche. However, unlike its predecessors, the Act 
expressly provided for the power to establish internment by regulation.74  
As Nazi Germany gained military ascendancy in 1940, fears of a fifth 
column arose and the pressure to intern in the name of national security 
increased.75 Some 28,000 enemy aliens were detained under the 
prerogative.76 Additionally, the government promulgated Regulation 18B of 
the Defence (General) Regulations, which authorized the internment of 
British subjects considered security risks. Approximately 2,000 persons 
were so detained.77 
A number of internment cases reached the courts. The most (in)famous 
was  Liversidge v. Anderson, where the House of Lords rejected a challenge 
to Regulation 18B.78 On its face, Regulation 18B permitted the Home 
Secretary to order a person detained “if he had reasonable cause to believe” 
the person was of hostile origin or associations, or that they had recent 
involvement in acts prejudicial to public safety or the defense of the realm.79 
A majority held that the regulation only required the Home Secretary 
subjectively believe the detainee had hostile origins or associations; the 
Home Secretary’s order was not to be second–guessed with an inquiry into 
the grounds for his belief.80 The majority reached this conclusion despite the 
  
 70. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260; LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, at 173. 
 71. Halliday, [1917] A.C. 260 at 291–94. 
 72. Id. at 299. 
 73. 2 & 3 Geo. 6, c. 62 (Eng.). 
 74. SIMPSON, supra note 68, at 46; Bishop, supra note 4, at 144. 
 75. LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, at 174. 
 76. SIMPSON, supra note 68, at 258. 
 77. Id. at 1. See also BONNER, supra note 66, at 64. 
 78. Liversidge v. Anderson, [1942] A.C. 206 (appeal taken from Eng.); see also 
SIMPSON, supra note 68, at 333–45, 355–66. 
 79. Liversidge, [1942] A.C. at 220. 
 80. Id. at 224 (Viscount Maugham), 254 & 258 (Lord MacMillan), 261 (Lord 
Wright), 282 (Lord Romer). There was a patina of due process in the form of an 
administrative appeal before an advisory committee, which was supposed to inform detainees 
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fact that the Regulation’s original wording, which required that the Home 
Secretary merely be “satisfied,” had been changed to “reasonable cause to 
believe” because of parliamentary pressure.81 Although the majority left 
open a theoretical avenue of review in the form of an exception for bad 
faith,82 the upshot of the decision was to make the Home Secretary’s 
decision effectively unreviewable.83 
Lord Shaw’s earlier dissenting role was reprised here by Lord Atkin. 
Lord Atkin argued that, given the Regulation’s wording, the courts were 
entitled to do more than simply accept the government’s word on trust.84 His 
dissent pulled no punches when it came to his judicial colleagues: 
I view with apprehension the attitude of judges who on a mere question of 
construction when face to face with claims involving the liberty of the 
subject show themselves more executive minded than the executive. . . . In 
this country, amid the clash of arms, the laws are not silent. They may be 
changed, but they speak the same language in war as in peace. . . . In this 
case I have listened to arguments which might have been addressed 
acceptably to the Court of King’s Bench in the time of Charles I.85 
Subsequent court decisions during the Cold War continued the pattern of 
the wartime decisions, deferring to executive claims of national security 
even where the civil liberties of those concerned were severely affected.86 In 
Ex parte Hosenball,87 the journalist Mark Hosenball sought to challenge the 
Home Secretary’s decision to have him deported using a discretionary 
power to order deportation where it was “conducive to the public good.”88 
Where national security concerns formed the basis of a deportation, there 
was no right of appeal.89 Instead there was an informal review process 
involving an advisory panel.90 At a hearing before the panel, the person 
  
of the grounds for their detention, and having heard from detainees, render non-binding 
advice to the Home Secretary. In practice, the advisory committee was itself not often privy 
to the grounds underlying the detention of detainees. See SIMPSON, supra note 68, at 88–89; 
A.W.B. Simpson, Rhetoric, Reality, and Regulation 18B, DENNING L.J. 123, 133 (1988). 
 81. SIMPSON, supra note 68, at 58-65; LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, at 176. 
 82. Liversidge, [1942] A.C. at 224 (Viscount Maugham), 258 (Lord MacMillan), 261 
(Lord Wright) 278 (Lord Romer); see also SIMPSON, supra note 68, at 362. 
 83. See BONNER, supra note 66, at 67. 
 84. Liversidge, [1942] A.C. at 246–47. 
 85. Id. at 244. Lord Atkin was subsequently ostracized by his judicial colleagues, 
quite possibly because of the strong tone of his dissent. See R.F.V. Heuston, Liversidge v. 
Anderson in Retrospect, 86 L.Q.R. 33, 48 (1970).  
 86. GEARTY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, supra note 4, at 36. 
 87. [1977] 1 W.L.R. 766 (C.A.) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 88. Immigration Act, 1971, ch. 77, § 3(5) (U.K.). 
 89. Immigration Act, 1971, ch. 77, § 15(3) (U.K.) (repealed). See LUSTGARTEN & 
LEIGH, supra note 3, at 183–84. 
 90. See Nicholas Blake, Judicial Review of Expulsion Decisions: Reflections on the 
UK Experience, in THE UNITY OF PUBLIC LAW 225, 235–36 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2004). 
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could make representations and call witnesses, but could not hear or 
challenge the case brought against him. There was also no right to legal 
representation. After the hearing, the Home Secretary would reconsider the 
decision to deport in light of the panel’s confidential advice.91 
Hosenball was only notified that he had obtained information harmful to 
the national security of the United Kingdom, including information harmful 
to servants of the Crown.92 He claimed that the deportation procedure was 
contrary to the principles of natural justice, because he had not been 
provided adequate notice of the allegations against him. This argument 
failed in the Court of Appeal.93 Lord Denning cited with approval the 
majority judgments in Liversidge and Halliday, and stated that this too, was 
a case about national security. In such a case, even the principles of natural 
justice had to be relaxed.94  
In 1983, the Minister of Civil Service, Margaret Thatcher, decided that 
union membership was to be banned at Government Communications 
Headquarters (GCHQ),95 and issued an instruction to that effect. Those 
affected, the public servants who worked at GCHQ, sought judicial review, 
claiming that the principles of natural justice required prior consultation 
before changes were made to their employment conditions.96 In the ensuing 
House of Lords decision, the majority ruled that the exercise of the 
prerogative, which was relied on as the source of power for Thatcher’s 
actions, was in principle amenable to judicial review,97 and that the 
established practice of consultation with the unions at GCHQ gave rise to a 
legitimate expectation that the practice would continue. This would 
ordinarily have been sufficient to hold the order banning union membership 
unlawful for breach of the principles of natural justice, but for the 
imperatives of national security.98 Ultimately, the government prevailed 
because the Law Lords accepted that the decision to ban union membership 
was announced without prior consultation due to national security; any 
advance notice of the intention to abolish union membership might itself 
  
This process was modeled on the procedures set up for the administration of Regulation 18B 
in World War II. See DYZENHAUS, supra note 4, at 161. 
 91. Hosenball, [1977] 1 W.L.R. at 780. See also LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, 
at 185. 
 92. Hosenball, [1977] 1 W.L.R. at 770–71. For a fuller account, see LUSTGARTEN & 
LEIGH, supra note 3, at 185.  
 93. Hosenball, [1977] 1 W.L.R. at 782–83. See also LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra 
note 3, at 185–86. 
 94. Hosenball, [1977] 1 W.L.R. at 778–79. 
 95. GCHQ collects signals intelligence. It is the British counterpart of the National 
Security Agency.  
 96. Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 
374 (H.L.) 394 (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter GCHQ case]. 
 97. Id. at 399–400 (Lord Fraser), 407 (Lord Scarman) & 410 (Lord Diplock).  
 98. Id. at 401 (Lord Fraser), 412 (Lord Diplock). 
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have resulted in industrial action, the very thing that the decision was meant 
to prevent.99 
Once national security was invoked, the judges quickly fell into line. 
Lord Diplock, for example, emphasized that national security was an area 
where the courts deferred: “It is par excellence a non–justiciable 
question.”100 Notably, the “ample evidence,”101 as Lord Diplock put it, of the 
national security interest at stake consisted of a Cabinet Secretary’s sworn 
assertion that the non–consultation with the unions had been motivated by 
the government’s fears of provoking industrial action that would in turn 
threaten national security.102 The House of Lords proved generously 
credulous, as this ultimately decisive national security argument appeared 
only after the government had lost at first instance.103 
The case of R v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex parte Cheblak 
again concerned the power to deport for reasons of national security.104 
Cheblak, a Lebanese resident of the United Kingdom since 1975, was 
detained pending deportation upon the start of hostilities in the first Gulf 
War.105 Like Hosenball, because national security concerns were the basis of 
his deportation, his only recourse was to appeal to the advisory panel. 
Cheblak subsequently challenged his treatment in court.  
The legality of Cheblak’s detention, and by extension those in the same 
situation as him,106 turned on the contents of the notice provided. Cheblak’s 
  
 99. Id. at 403 (Lord Fraser), 412 (Lord Diplock). There had been seven industrial 
disputes at GCHQ between 1979 and 1981. See Gavin Drewry, The GCHQ Case—A Failure 
of Government Communications, 38 PARL. AFFAIRS 371, 376 (1985).  
 100. GCHQ case, [1985] A.C. at 412 (Lord Diplock). 
 101. Id. 
 102. See LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, at 331. Lustgarten and Leigh are 
particularly critical of this aspect of the decision. See id. at 351. 
 103. Id. at 332. Lustgarten and Leigh emphasize that the judgments should be 
understood in the context of the Cold War:  
They arise from the fear-ridden atmosphere of the days when the 
Cold War divisions calcified into rival military blocks, and reflect 
unspoken political assumptions so long dominant and hence lying so 
deep that the Law Lords may not have been aware of how powerfully 
those assumptions had shaped their approach to the legal issues. 
Id. at 329. 
 104. [1991] 1 W.L.R. 890 (C.A.) (Eng.). 
 105. Immigration Act, 1971, ch. 77, § 5(5), sch. 3 (U.K.); LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, 
supra note 3, at 187. People with links to the Palestine Liberation Organization and Iraqi 
nationals with military links in particular were targeted on the basis that they might engage in 
terrorist attacks in the United Kingdom. See BONNER, supra note 66, at 126. 
 106. Cheblak himself was eventually not deported, but the case established an 
important precedent, particularly in relation to the 171 foreign nationals from the Middle 
East region served with deportation notices and detained. See Ian Leigh, The Gulf War 
Deportations and the Courts P.L. 331, 333 (1991). These detentions, too, proved to be an 
overreaction. See LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, at 190. See also Nick Cohen, Return 
of the H-Block THE OBSERVER, Nov. 18, 2001 at 31; Home Affairs Committee, The Anti–
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notice only stated that he was to be deported for reasons of national 
security, although in the course of proceedings, counsel for the government 
revealed that he was alleged to have unspecified connections to terrorism, 
making him a security risk.107 The Court of Appeal rejected the argument 
that Cheblak had not been provided with sufficient reasons for his 
deportation. Lord Donaldson ruled that the court, in the absence of bad 
faith, was not in a position to second–guess a Home Office affidavit that 
stated further notice could not be given because further disclosure might 
threaten national security.108 
The Court was plainly of the view that the first recourse should be the 
non–statutory advisory panel.109 The Court claimed to be willing to review 
the fairness of the panel’s procedures, but the fact that it was dealing with 
matters of national security also had to be taken into account.110 As for the 
Home Secretary’s decision, this was also theoretically subject to judicial 
review. However, given that the Home Secretary could not be compelled to 
produce any further information about what motivated his decision, the 
decision was for all intents and purposes unreviewable.111 
C. Buyer’s Remorse 
The history of judicial deference during times of war or crisis (real or 
perceived) seems quite clear. After the war or crisis has passed, there is 
often a change of attitude. As David Dyzenhaus observes, after the fact the 
majority judgments tend to be regarded as “badges of shame,” and it is the 
dissenting judgments that are seen as charting the correct course for the 
future.112 This ex post regret is exemplified by Korematsu and Liversidge, 
  
Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001–2 (First Report of Session 2001-2002), Nov. 19, 
2001, H.C. 351, at [32] (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmhaff/351/35102.htm. 
 107. [1991] 1 W.L.R. at 896. 
 108. Id. at 903, 905. For a critical view, see Leigh, supra note 106, at 334.  
 109. Cheblak, [1991] 1 W.L.R. at 906–08. 
 110. Id. at 902. 
 111. Id. at 905. The Court’s retreat behind the accountability mechanisms of the 
advisory panel and the Home Secretary’s accountability to Parliament is problematic. See id. 
at 902. The hearings before advisory panel did not match the rosy picture that the Court 
drew: the average hearing was over in 45 to 60 minutes. The Home Secretary’s 
accountability to Parliament in practice amounted to little: there was no accountability for 
failure to follow the advisory panel’s advice because the panel’s recommendations were 
secret. See LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, at 188–89. 
 112. David Dyzenhaus, Cycles of Legality in Emergency Times, 18 P.L. REV. 165, 165 
(2007) [hereinafter Dyzenhaus, Cycles of Legality]. See also Tushnet, Defending 
Korematsu?, supra note 26, at 127 (“[T]he pattern commonly attributed to the civil liberties 
implications of government policies in wartime: The government acts, the courts endorse or 
acquiesce, and—sooner or later—society reaches a judgment that the action was unjustified 
and the courts mistaken.”); BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK 60–61 (2006) 
(discussing the pattern of crisis, re-examination after the fact, followed by the “casting [of] 
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the two World War II-era cases that in many ways have come to represent 
the wartime phenomenon of executive overreaction coupled with judicial 
deference. 
The failure of the Supreme Court to hold the government’s evacuation 
and internment of Japanese in the United States unconstitutional in the face 
of claims of military necessity is well known. Over time, many participants, 
including government officials and Supreme Court Justices, came to regret 
their roles in the affair.113 The Korematsu decision itself became a legal 
pariah.114 More than forty years later, the United States government would 
apologize for the internment.115 Similarly, the hands-off approach taken by 
the House of Lords in cases such as Liversidge has also met with 
criticism.116 The case is most well remembered for Lord Atkin’s celebrated 
dissent,117 and in the court of history, Lord Atkin’s view has seemingly 
prevailed.118 
But despite the acknowledgement of past errors, the cycle seems to 
repeat as judges again revert to a deferential approach whenever national 
security is invoked by the executive, even when the case occurs in a context 
other than an actual war.119 The result is a cyclical pattern of contraction and 
expansion of liberty as war and crises come and go.120 
  
doubt upon the constitutional propriety of the courts’ momentary permissiveness.”); STONE, 
supra note 10, at 544, 547 (observing a recurring pattern of excessive civil liberties 
restrictions in times of war and a judicial propensity to defer during crisis periods).  
 113. STONE, supra note 10, at 304–05. 
 114. See, e.g., Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases—A Disaster, 54 
YALE L.J. 489, 489–90 (1945). See also infra text accompanying notes 260–262. 
 115. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988). 
 116. See SIMPSON, supra note 68, at 418–19 (concluding that “the courts did virtually 
nothing” for those detained under Regulation 18B). See also LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra 
note 3, at 178. 
 117. See SIMPSON, supra note 68, at 363 (providing criticism of the reasons behind 
Lord Atkin’s dissent). Bonner implies that there is a little too much celebration of the dissent. 
See BONNER, supra note 66, at 67. Turpin and Tomkins argue that Lord Shaw’s earlier 
dissent in Halliday is actually more praiseworthy. See COLIN TURPIN & ADAM TOMKINS, 
BRITISH GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION 757 (6th ed. 2007). 
 118. See R v. Home Secretary ex parte Khawaja [1984] 1 A.C. 74, 110 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (“The classic dissent of Lord Atkin in Liversidge v. Anderson is now 
accepted as correct not only on the point of construction of [R]egulation 18 (b) of the then 
emergency Regulations but in its declaration of English legal principle.” (citations omitted)); 
R v. I.R.C. ex parte Rossminster, [1980] 1 A.C. 952 (H.L.) 1011 (appeal taken from Eng.) (“I 
think the time has come to acknowledge openly that the majority of this House in  Liversidge 
v. Anderson were expediently and, at that time, perhaps, excusably, wrong and the dissenting 
speech of Lord Atkin was right.”); Ali v. Jayaratne, [1951] A.C. 66 (H.L.) 76 (appeal taken 
from Ceylon) (“[I]t would be a very unfortunate thing if the decision of  Liversidge’s  case 
came to be regarded as laying down any general rule as to the construction of such phrases 
when they appear in statutory enactments.”). See also Alec Samuels, The Quietus of 
Liversidge v. Anderson?, 14 STATUTE L. REV. 140 (1993); Heuston, supra note 85, at 53–68. 
 119. Dyzenhaus, Cycles of Legality, supra note 112, at 165. 
 120. Discussing the Quirin decision, Fisher writes, “Judicial rulings during World 
War II provided disturbing evidence of a Court in the midst of war forfeiting its role as the 
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II.  THE RECENT WAR ON TERROR DECISIONS 
Having discussed the cases that underlie the conventional account of 
judicial behavior in times of war and crisis, this part of the Article briefly 
outlines the recent War on Terror decisions. These are the decisions of the 
Supreme Court and House of Lords that, broadly speaking, deal with 
aspects of the War on Terror and were decided between September 11, 2001 
and October 2009.121 
A. The Supreme Court 
In June 2004, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases concerning 
the detention of terrorist suspects. Two cases, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld122 and 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla,123 concerned the predicament of American citizens 
detained indefinitely as enemy combatants. The third, Rasul v. Bush,124 
addressed the position of foreign detainees held at the Guantánamo Naval 
Base in Cuba. 
Yaser Hamdi was captured in November 2001 in Afghanistan by 
Northern Alliance forces who subsequently turned him over to American 
forces. Initially detained at Guantánamo, Hamdi was later held as an enemy 
combatant at naval brigs in Virginia and South Carolina.125 His father filed a 
writ of habeas corpus on his behalf, effectively beginning the litigation.126 
By the time Hamdi’s case reached the Supreme Court, there were two issues 
to be resolved: first, whether there was legal authority to detain persons 
such as Hamdi, and second, to what extent, if any, persons in his position 
could contest their detention. 
The Supreme Court ruled five to four that the military could detain 
Hamdi as an enemy combatant because Congress had impliedly authorized 
such detention through the Authorization for the Use of Military Force 
  
guardian of constitutional rights. . . . With the war safely over, the Court began to reassert 
itself and place restrictions on military tribunals and courts–martial, gradually restoring the 
right of U.S. citizens to a jury trial in the civilian courts.” See FISHER, supra note 38, at 254. 
Similarly, in discussing the House of Lords’ inaction in Liversidge, Lustgarten and Leigh 
observe, “[t]he function of the courts in this situation was to be seen to assist the government 
to maintain the state through the crisis, so that in more normal times civil liberties could be 
restored and guaranteed long term.” LUSTGARTEN & LEIGH, supra note 3, at 179; REHNQUIST, 
supra note 21, at 223–25. 
 121. The assumption of the judicial functions of the House of Lords by the United 
Kingdom Supreme Court in October 2009 provides a logical end date. 
 122. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 123. 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 124. 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004). 
 125. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510. 
 126. Id. at 511. 
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(AUMF) enacted shortly after 9/11.127 However, a different majority 
concluded that the government’s evidence was an inadequate factual basis 
for Hamdi’s detention, meaning that further process in the form of a hearing 
was necessary.128 Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion outlined a basic 
framework for conducting such a hearing. Significantly, Justice O’Connor 
suggested that it would not offend due process to permit the use of hearsay 
evidence, a presumption in favor of government evidence, and the use of 
military tribunals.129  
The second decision concerned Jose Padilla, who had been arrested by 
FBI agents at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport in May 2002. Although initially 
detained as a material witness, Padilla was subsequently designated an 
enemy combatant, transferred into military custody, and detained 
indefinitely. The allegation at the time was that Padilla was plotting a 
radiological “dirty bomb” attack on unknown targets within the United 
States.130 Padilla’s lawyer, who had been appointed to represent him in the 
earlier court proceedings, filed a writ of habeas corpus on his behalf in New 
York. The Supreme Court disposed of Padilla’s case on procedural grounds 
without addressing its merits. In a five to four decision, the Court ruled that 
Padilla’s petition should have been brought in South Carolina, the state 
where Padilla was physically being held.131 
The third decision, Rasul v. Bush, concerned fourteen detainees who had 
been captured in Afghanistan and detained at Guantánamo. They 
subsequently sought writs of habeas corpus.132 In the lower courts, the Bush 
Administration, relying on the World War II–era precedent of Johnson v. 
Eisentrager,133 had successfully argued that the courts had no jurisdiction to 
hear claims from Guantánamo detainees, who were non-citizens detained 
outside American territory.134 However, the Supreme Court held six-to-three 
that the Guantánamo detainees were entitled to petition American courts 
under the habeas corpus statute.135 Justice Stevens’ majority opinion 
distinguished Eisentrager in several ways: these detainees came from 
countries that were not at war with the United States, the detainees all 
denied engaging in hostile acts against the United States, none of the 
  
 127. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 
(2001). Five justices accepted that the AUMF justified Hamdi’s detention. See Hamdi, 542 
U.S. at 507. 
 128. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (“[D]ue process demands that a citizen held in the United 
States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis 
for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”). 
 129. Id. at 533–34. 
 130. ELSEA, supra note 46, at 2–3. 
 131. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426. 
 132. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471–73. 
 133. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 134. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002); Al Odah v. United 
States, 321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
 135. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006); Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. 
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detainees had ever been tried or convicted of any wrongdoing, and all of 
them had been detained for more than two years on territory over which the 
United States had exclusive jurisdiction and control.136  
However, these factual distinctions were not the basis of Rasul’s holding. 
Rather, Justice Stevens stated that Eisentrager was concerned with the 
constitutional rather than statutory right to habeas corpus. The habeas 
corpus statute had been reinterpreted since Eisentrager to allow petitions 
from detainees of the United States held overseas.137 Additionally, the 
presumption against the extraterritorial application of statutes was 
inapplicable because Guantánamo Bay was indefinitely within the 
“complete jurisdiction and control” of the United States.138 Ultimately, there 
was no dispute that the District Court had jurisdiction over the detainees’ 
custodians, and thus it also had jurisdiction to hear statutory habeas 
petitions from Guantánamo detainees.139 
The next case to reach the Supreme Court concerned the Bush 
Administration’s plans to try certain Guantánamo detainees before military 
commissions that had been established by Presidential Order in November 
2001.140 In July 2003, the first detainees were designated for trial before 
these military commissions.141 Among them was Salim Hamdan, who was 
alleged to be Osama Bin Laden’s bodyguard and driver. Hamdan was later 
charged with conspiracy to commit various war crimes.142 However, the 
system of military commissions that had been established to try him on 
these charges, with its irregular procedures and relaxed evidential standards, 
was itself challenged.143 
In November 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.144 In 
December, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA),145 
which purported to strip the courts of jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus 
applications from Guantánamo detainees, substituting instead a system that 
provided for limited review.146 Nevertheless, in June 2006, the Supreme 
Court ruled five to three in favor of Hamdan.147 The majority first rejected 
  
 136. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 476. 
 137. Id. at 478–79. 
 138. Id. at 480–81. 
 139. Id. at 483–84.  
 140. Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against 
Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833, 57, 834–35 (Nov. 13, 2001). 
 141. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 569 (2006). 
 142. See Jonathan Mahler, The Bush Administration vs. Salim Hamdan, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, Jan. 8, 2006, at 44. 
 143. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 613. 
 144. Id. at 572. 
 145. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–148 §§ 1002-1003, 119 Stat. 
2739, 2739–40 (2005). See Arsalan M. Suleman, Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 19 HARV. 
HUM. RTS. J. 257 (2006). 
 146. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, § 1005(e)(1)–(3). 
 147. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
2010] The Supreme Court and House of Lords in the War on Terror 19 
 
the contention that the DTA left the Court without jurisdiction to review 
habeas corpus cases pending at the time of the DTA’s enactment.148 On the 
merits of the case, Justice Stevens ruled that Hamdan’s military commission 
could not proceed because it violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice 
(UCMJ) and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. First, Hamdan’s military 
commission violated the UCMJ’s uniformity principle, which required that 
the procedures for military commissions and courts–martial be the same 
insofar as practicable.149 Second, the military commission violated Common 
Article 3 (CA3) of the Geneva Conventions, applicable by way of Article 21 
of the UCMJ’s reference to the law of war, because it did not satisfy CA3’s 
requirement of trial before a regularly–constituted court.150 
The Hamdan decision led to the hasty enactment of the Military 
Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA).151 The MCA effectively undid the 
Hamdan decision; it explicitly authorized the use of military commissions, 
albeit while making some procedural improvements.152 Additionally, the 
MCA unequivocally removed the statutory right of all non-citizen detainees 
to seek habeas corpus.153 This aspect of the MCA became the focus of the 
next case that came before the Supreme Court, Boumediene v. Bush.154 The 
petitioners in Boumediene were a number of non–citizen detainees held at 
Guantánamo who sought habeas corpus. With the statutory avenue to 
habeas corpus closed by the MCA, Boumediene squarely addressed the 
entitlement of these detainees to the constitutional privilege of habeas 
corpus.155  
The Court’s decision turned on two issues: first, whether the petitioners, 
being non–citizens held outside the United States, could invoke the 
protection of the Suspension Clause; and second, whether the review 
process set up by the DTA was an adequate substitute for habeas corpus. 
Writing for a majority of five, Justice Kennedy ruled that the petitioners 
were entitled to seek the constitutional writ of habeas corpus, which could 
only be denied in accordance with the Suspension Clause.156 Additionally, 
  
 148. Id. at 616. Chief Justice Roberts, having earlier heard the case as a Judge on the 
D.C. Circuit, did not participate. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 149. Hamdan, at 619–25. 
 150. Id. at 630–35. 
 151. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109–336, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006). 
 152. See Stephen J. Ellmann, The “Rule of Law” and the Military Commission, 51 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 760, 793–96 (2006). 
 153. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7. 
 154. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008). 
 155. Id. at 2240 (“Petitioners present a question not resolved by our earlier cases 
relating to the detention of aliens at Guantanamo: whether they have the constitutional 
privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be withdrawn except in conformance with the 
Suspension Clause, Art. I, § 9, cl. 2.”). 
 156. Id. at 2262 (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full effect at 
Guantanamo Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now 
 
20 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1 
 
the majority ruled that the substitute review process on which the 
government relied—military–run Combatant Status Review Tribunals 
(CSRTs) based on Justice O’Connor’s suggestions in Hamdi, combined 
with review in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals per the DTA—was an 
inadequate substitute for habeas corpus.157 The majority therefore held that 
Congress, in passing the MCA, had unconstitutionally suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus in violation of the Suspension Clause.158 
Decided on the same day as Boumediene was Munaf v. Geren.159 This 
case concerned two American citizens, Munaf and Omar, who had 
voluntarily travelled to Iraq, and subsequently been detained by 
Multinational Force Iraq (MNF–I) after allegedly committing crimes there. 
Petitions for habeas corpus were filed on behalf of both men by family 
members. In the lower courts, Omar had obtained a preliminary injunction 
barring his transfer to Iraqi custody. Munaf’s petition had been dismissed 
for lack of jurisdiction.  
The Supreme Court unanimously concluded that United States courts 
had jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed on behalf of citizens such 
as Munaf and Omar, who were held by American forces operating as part of 
a multinational force. Both were in the immediate physical custody of 
American forces answering only to the American chain of command. This 
was enough to determine the issue of jurisdiction under the habeas corpus 
statute.160  
Rather than remanding the case, the Supreme Court exceptionally 
reached the merits of the petitions, noting that these cases “involve habeas 
petitions that implicate sensitive foreign policy issues in the context of 
ongoing military operations.”161 According to Chief Justice Roberts, Munaf 
and Omar were effectively asking for court orders requiring the United 
States to prevent their transfer to a sovereign government seeking to try 
them for alleged crimes committed in its territory. Given that Iraq clearly 
had the sovereign right to prosecute them for their alleged crimes, it was 
inappropriate for United States courts to interfere.162 The fact that the 
relevant criminal process might not comport with all American 
constitutional guarantees,163 or that transfer to Iraqi custody might 
hypothetically result in their torture, did not alter this position.164  
  
before us, Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension 
Clause.”). 
 157. Id. at 2273. 
 158. Id. 
 159. 553 U.S. 674 (2008). 
 160. Id. at 686–88. 
 161. Id. at 692. 
 162. Id. at 694–95. 
 163. Id. at 695. 
 164. See id. at 703 (noting that the Court, despite Munaf and Omar’s worry over 
potential torture in Iraqi custody, refused to address the issue due to the issue’s absence in 
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The final Supreme Court decision discussed here, Iqbal, concerned a 
point of civil procedure.165 But its facts arose out of the early days after 
9/11. The plaintiff, Javaid Iqbal, was a Pakistani national arrested on 
criminal charges and detained in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks. Subsequently, Iqbal filed suit against federal corrections officers 
and officials, including former Attorney General John Ashcroft, and FBI 
Director Robert Mueller.166  
More specifically, Iqbal’s claim alleged that he had been subjected to 
various forms of mistreatment during his time in custody in the 
Administrative Maximum Special Housing Unit (ADMAX SHU).167 In 
relation to Ashcroft and Mueller, Iqbal alleged that they had illegally 
classified him as being a person of high interest on account of his religion or 
national origin, and, in so doing, had violated the First and Fifth 
Amendments. Iqbal further alleged that his mistreatment at the ADMAX 
SHU was the result of a policy put in place and implemented by Ashcroft 
and Mueller.168 
Writing for a majority of five, Justice Kennedy stated that in order to 
succeed, Iqbal had to plead sufficient factual matter to show that Ashcroft 
and Mueller had adopted the detention policies in question for the purpose 
of discriminating on the basis of race, religion, or national origin.169 Justice 
Kennedy found that Iqbal’s complaint fell short of this standard. Several of 
Iqbal’s allegations were too conclusory and thus not entitled to be assumed 
true. Moreover, the factual allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller did not 
suggest an entitlement to relief because they did not plausibly show 
purposeful discrimination.170 
B. The House of Lords 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Rehman was decided by 
the House of Lords right around the time of the 9/11 attacks. Rehman 
concerned a decision by the Home Secretary to deport a Pakistani national 
on national security grounds because of his association with an organization 
involved in terrorist activities on the Indian subcontinent.171 Rehman 
  
their certiorari filings; essentially it may be argued that the Court dodged the issue via 
Munaf and Omar’s procedural error). 
 165. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). 
 166. Id. at 1944. 
 167. Id. (“For instance, the complaint alleges that [Iqbal’s] jailors ‘kicked him in the 
stomach, punched him in the face, and dragged him across’ his cell without justification … 
subjected him to serial strip and body-cavity searches when he posed no safety risk to 
himself or others … and refused to let him and other Muslims pray because there would be 
‘[n]o prayers for terrorists’.”). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1948–49. 
 170. Id. at 1951–52. 
 171. Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 A.C. 153 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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appealed to a specialist tribunal known as the Special Immigration Appeals 
Commission (SIAC).172 SIAC ruled that “national security” had to involve a 
threat targeted at the United Kingdom and that Rehman was not a threat to 
national security so defined.173 The House of Lords, however, disagreed 
with the narrow view of “national security” taken by SIAC, and emphasized 
that this was an area where the judiciary should defer to the views of the 
executive.174 This attitude was strikingly expressed by Lord Hoffmann:   
I wrote this speech some three months before the recent events in New 
York and Washington. They are a reminder that in matters of national 
security, the cost of failure can be high. This seems to me to underline the 
need for the judicial arm of government to respect the decisions of 
ministers of the Crown on the question of whether support for terrorist 
activities in a foreign country constitutes a threat to national security. It is 
not only that the executive has access to special information and expertise 
in these matters. It is also that such decisions, with serious potential results 
for the community, require a legitimacy which can be conferred only by 
entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the 
democratic process.175 
The first major legislative response to the 9/11 attacks was the enactment 
of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), which 
contained a battery of new counter–terrorism powers. The most severe was 
the authorization of a system of indefinite detention for terrorist suspects.176 
Prior to its eventual repeal, Part 4 of the ATCSA empowered the Home 
Secretary to certify a person a “suspected international terrorist” for the 
purposes of the ATCSA if the Home Secretary reasonably believed that the 
person’s presence in the United Kingdom was a risk to national security and 
  
 172. SIAC replaced the advisory panel that had previously operated in such cases. See 
BONNER, supra note 66, at 127–34. See generally Special Immigration Appeals Commission 
Act, 1997, c. 68 (Eng.); CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, THE OPERATION OF THE 
SPECIAL IMMIGRATION APPEALS COMMISSION (SIAC) AND THE USE OF SPECIAL ADVOCATES 
2004-05, Mar. 22, 2005, H.C. 323-I, (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200 405/cmselect/cmconst/323/323i.pdf. 
 173. See Rehman, [2003] 1 A.C. at [4]–[6]. 
 174. Id. at [26] (Lord Slynn) (“[The Home Secretary] is undoubtedly in the best 
position to judge what national security requires even if his decision is open to review. The 
assessment of what is needed in the light of changing circumstances is primarily for him.”), 
at [28] (Lord Steyn) (“Even democracies are entitled to protect themselves, and the executive 
is the best judge of the need for international co-operation to combat terrorism and counter-
terrorist strategies.”). See also Laurence Lustgarten, National Security, Terrorism and 
Constitutional Balance, 75 POL. Q. 4, 11 (2004). 
 175. Rehman, [2003] 1 A.C. at [62]. 
 176. Anti–Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 c. 24 (Eng.). For an overview of 
the ATCSA, see Adam Tomkins, Legislating Against Terror: the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001, P.L. 205 (2002). 
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suspected that the person was a “terrorist.”177 In instances where legal or 
practical considerations barred the United Kingdom from removing a non–
citizen certified as a suspected international terrorist,178 Section 23 of the 
ATCSA authorized indefinite detention.179 The Home Secretary’s 
certification decision could only be scrutinized in proceedings before 
SIAC,180 which could cancel a certification if it concluded that there were no 
reasonable grounds for suspecting the person to be a terrorist as defined in 
Section 21(1).181  
Part 4 of the ATCSA was controversial, not in the least because its 
indefinite detention regime plainly infringed Article 5 of the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
1950 (ECHR),182 which protects the right to liberty and security of the 
person. Part 4 therefore required the British government to lodge a formal 
derogation from Article 5 in accordance with Article 15 of the ECHR.183 
Despite a number of different bodies recommending otherwise,184 the Blair 
Government persisted with indefinite detention under the ATCSA. 
Sixteen persons suspected of various terrorism–related activities were 
certified by the Home Secretary and detained at Belmarsh Prison in 
London.185 Several detainees challenged the lawfulness of their detention. In 
  
 177. Anti–Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 §§ 21(1), (2), (5). The term 
“terrorist” was itself broadly defined to include those involved in the commission of terrorist 
acts, members of international terrorist groups, and those with links with terrorist groups. See 
id. §§ 21(2), (4). 
 178. Typically, these cases arose where criminal prosecution was difficult, and where 
deportation was not feasible because of concerns that the certified person might be 
mistreated upon returning to his home country. See Chahal v. United Kingdom, 12 Eur. Ct. 
H.R. Rep. 413, 455 (1996) (holding that it violates Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights to deport or extradite a person where “substantial grounds have been shown 
for believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected 
to treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country.”).  
 179. Anti–Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 § 23(1). 
 180. Anti–Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 §§ 21(8)–(9), 25, 26. 
 181. Anti–Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001 §§ 25(2), (5). 
 182. Human Rights Act (Designated Derogation Order), 1998, S.I. 2001/3644 (U.K.). 
 183. See Id. Formal notice of the derogation order was lodged on 18 Dec. 2001. The 
United Kingdom also derogated from Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights 1966. See A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 
56, [2005] 2 A.C. 68 [11] (Lord Bingham) [hereinafter A v. Secretary of State (No. 1)]. 
 184. PRIVY COUNSELLOR REVIEW COMMITTEE, ANTI–TERRORISM, CRIME AND 
SECURITY ACT 2001 REVIEW, 2003–4, H.C. 100, ¶ [205]–[243] (U.K.), available at 
http://www.archive2.official-documents.co.uk/document/deps/hc/hc100/100.pdf [hereinafter 
Newton Report]; JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REVIEW OF COUNTER–TERRORISM 
POWERS, 2003–4, H.L. 158, ¶ [52]–[64] (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200304/jtselect/jtrights/158/158.pdf; JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: 
PROSECUTION AND PRE-CHARGE DETENTION, 2005–6, H.L. 240 (U.K.), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200506/jtselect/jtrights/240/240.pdf.  
 185. Sangeeta Shah, The UK’s Anti–Terror Legislation and the House of Lords: The 
First Skirmish, 5 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 405–06 (2005) [hereinafter Shah, Skirmish]. 
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December 2004, a majority of the House of Lords ruled that the ATCSA 
detention regime was incompatible with the ECHR in A v. Secretary of State 
for the Home Department (also known as the Belmarsh case).186 Although 
there was a public emergency sufficient to warrant derogation under Article 
15 of the ECHR, indefinite detention under Section 23 of the ATCSA was 
not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, resulting in a breach 
of Article 5 of the ECHR.187 Additionally, the singling out of non–citizen 
terrorist suspects (but not citizen terrorist suspects) for detention amounted 
to discrimination in violation of Article 14.188 Accordingly, the House of 
Lords quashed the derogation order and declared Section 23 of the ATCSA 
incompatible with Articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR.189 
The House of Lords’ decision forced the Blair Government to alter its 
detention policy; part of this involved repealing Part 4 of the ATCSA, and 
replacing it with the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA).190 The PTA 
created a new legislative framework for detention by empowering the Home 
Secretary to impose control orders upon both citizen and non-citizen 
terrorist suspects who have “involvement in terrorism-related activity.”191 A 
control order imposes certain restrictions on the liberty of its target, the 
controlee, in order to restrict or prevent involvement in terrorism-related 
activity. It is an offense to breach an obligation in a control order without 
reasonable excuse.192 
The PTA creates two types of control orders.193 “Derogating” control 
orders impose sufficiently onerous infringements on an individual’s liberty 
as to require derogation from Article 5 of the ECHR, and can only be 
  
 186. [2005] 2 A.C. 68.  
 187. Id. at [43] (Lord Bingham), [81] (Lord Nicholls), [132]–[133] (Lord Hope), [156] 
(Lord Scott), [189] (Lord Rodger), [231] (Baroness Hale). 
 188. Id. at [68] (Lord Bingham), [138] (Lord Hope), [159] (Lord Scott), [189] (Lord 
Rodger), [232] (Baroness Hale). 
 189. Id. at [73] (Lord Bingham), [85] (Lord Nicholls), [139] (Lord Hope), [160] (Lord 
Scott), [239] (Baroness Hale), [240] (Lord Carswell). See generally Adam Tomkins, 
Readings of A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, P.L. 259, 259–60 (2005); 
Conor Gearty, 11 September 2001, Counter-terrorism, and the Human Rights Act, 32 J.L.S. 
18 (2005). 
 190. By March 2005, nine of the Belmarsh detainees had been released on strict bail 
conductions, leaving no one physically detained under Part 4 of the ATCSA. They were later 
made subject to control orders. See Clive Walker, Keeping Control of Terrorists Without 
Losing Control of Constitutionalism, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1395, 1410 (2007) [hereinafter 
Walker, Keeping Control]. 
 191. Prevention of Terrorism Act c. 2, § 1 (U.K.). Section 1(9) defines “terrorism-
related activity”. Written ministerial statement on control orders: 11 June 2010 – 10 
September 2010, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/parliamentary-
business/written-ministerial-statement/control-orders-sep2010-wms/(last visited Oct. 28, 
2010) (“As of September 2010, there were nine control orders in force, all of which were in 
respect of British citizens.”). 
 192. Prevention of Terrorism Act § 9. 
 193. See generally Walker, Keeping Control, supra note 191 (discussing the control 
order regime comprehensively). 
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imposed by the High Court upon application by the Home Secretary.194 
“Non–derogating” control orders impose specific combinations of 
restrictions upon individuals such as curfew, electronic tagging, searches of 
residences and other premises, restrictions on association, and restrictions 
on the use of telephones and the Internet.195 The Home Secretary may 
impose non–derogating control orders, although absent emergency, the 
High Court’s permission is required.196  The Home Secretary’s decision is 
then reviewed in a full hearing before the High Court.197  
Some of those who were made subject to non–derogating control orders 
(the controlees) brought litigation. There were two main grounds of 
challenge. The first was that the restrictions imposed by these non–
derogating control orders were in fact so onerous as to amount to a 
deprivation of liberty in breach of Article 5 of the ECHR. In October 2007, 
a majority of the House of Lords held in Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v. JJ that non-derogating control orders that included an 
eighteen hour curfew as part of their restrictions amounted to a deprivation 
of liberty, and were thus invalid as they could not be imposed by the Home 
Secretary under the terms of the PTA.198  
The second ground of challenge was based on the right to a fair hearing 
protected by Article 6 of the ECHR. This issue arose because the controlee 
was not entitled to see all of the factual material that underlay his or her 
particular control order. The PTA specifically authorizes procedural 
measures such as the non–disclosure of certain evidence, closed 
proceedings from which controlees and their lawyers are excluded,199 as 
well as the appointment of special advocates to represent controlees in the 
closed proceedings.200  
In Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB, a majority of the 
House of Lords gave a qualified endorsement to this scheme.201 The Lords 
emphasized that it was the fairness of the overall process that was 
important. The majority recognized the potential contribution of special 
advocates to fairness, but accepted that in certain cases the provision of a 
special advocate might not be sufficient to ensure compliance with Article 
  
 194. Prevention of Terrorism Act § 4. 
 195. Prevention of Terrorism Act § 1, [4]. 
 196. Id. at § 3, [1](a), (b). In cases where the Home Secretary does not have 
permission, the order must be immediately referred to court under § 3(3). 
 197. Id. at § 3, [2](c), [6](b), [6](c). 
 198. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 45, [2007] 3 
W.L.R. 642, [23]–[24] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 199. Prevention of Terrorism Act sch, [4](2), [7]. See also Civil Procedure 
(Amendment No 2) Rules 2005, 2005 S.I. 2005/656, rules 76.22–25, 76.28, 76.29. 
 200. See generally John Ip, The Rise and Spread of the Special Advocate, P.L. 717 
(2008). 
 201. Secretary of State for the Home Department v. MB [2007] UKHL 46, [2007] 3 
W.L.R. 681 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
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6.202 In cases where a special advocate was not enough to ensure fairness, 
the majority held that Section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998 should be 
invoked to read down the relevant provisions of the PTA and its associated 
procedural regulations so that they only took effect where this was 
consistent with fairness.203 In a subsequent decision, Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v. AF, the House of Lords clarified that Article 6 
required the disclosure of the core of the case against the controlee so that 
the controlee could adequately brief the special advocate.204 
The other part of the Blair Government’s post–Belmarsh detention 
strategy—a renewed effort at deportation by securing diplomatic assurances 
from foreign governments not to mistreat deported terrorist suspects205—
came under scrutiny in RB(Algeria) v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department.206 The Home Secretary sought to deport three men—one 
Jordanian (Othman) and two Algerians (RB and U)—on national security 
grounds. All three contended that the Home Secretary could not take this 
action because this would result in their exposure to a real risk of torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3 of the ECHR.207  
The British government had received specific diplomatic assurances 
from the respective governments that the returned men would not be subject 
to torture or other ill treatment.208 At first instance, SIAC held that the 
assurances from the respective foreign governments were sufficient to 
satisfy the requirements of Article 3.209 The House of Lords unanimously 
upheld this decision on appeal.210 In effect, the House of Lords held that the 
assurances provided by the foreign governments in these cases meant that 
there were no substantial grounds for believing that the three men, if 
deported, would face a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3.211 
The House of Lords’ two other post–9/11 War on Terror decisions dealt 
with issues other than detention and deportation. One concerned whether 
SIAC could take into account evidence procured through torture perpetrated 
by foreign agents when hearing appeals against certification under the 
  
 202. Id. at [35], [66], [85], [90].  
 203. Id. at [44], [72], [84], [92]. 
 204. See Secretary of State for the Home Department v. AF, [2009] UKHL 28 (appeal 
taken from Eng.).   
 205. See Mark Elliott, United Kingdom: The “War on Terror,” U.K. Style – The 
Detention and Deportation of Suspected Terrorists, 8 INT’L J. CON. L. 131, 138–39 (2010). 
 206. [2009] UKHL 10 (appeal taken from Eng.). 
 207. Id. at [1]. See generally Chahal, supra note 180. 
 208. RB(Algeria), supra note 207, at [106]–[108]. 
 209. Id. at [25]–[35], [45]–[52]. 
 210. Id. at [120]–[126] (Lord Phillips), [192]–[196] (Lord Hoffmann), [241] (Lord 
Hope), [254] (Lord Brown), [265] (Lord Mance). 
 211. Othman also argued that there were substantial grounds for believing his 
deportation would lead to him facing a real risk of flagrant violations of Articles 5 and 6 of 
the ECHR. SIAC rejected these claims as well. These conclusions were also upheld on 
appeal. Id. at [130]–[154] (Lord Phillips). 
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ATCSA detention regime.212 SIAC, being a special tribunal, was not bound 
by the law of evidence.213 By the time these proceedings reached the House 
of Lords, Part 4 of the ATCSA had already been repealed. However, the 
appeals were allowed to continue.214 While conceding that evidence 
obtained through torture with the involvement or complicity of British 
officials would be inadmissible and an abuse of process,215 the Home 
Secretary’s position was that the same did not apply to evidence obtained 
through torture by foreign agents.  In A v. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department (No. 2) (the Torture case), the House of Lords ruled 
unanimously that no British court (including SIAC) could rely on evidence 
that might have been procured through torture, regardless of the nationality 
of the torturer.216 However, the Lords disagreed on the standard of proof to 
be met before this prophylactic rule applied. A majority of four ruled that it 
had to be established to the balance of probabilities that the evidence was 
obtained via torture.217  
The other decision, R(Gillan) v. Commissioner of Police for the 
Metropolis,218 concerned the power of a senior police officer under the 
Terrorism Act 2000 to authorize blanket, suspicion-less stops and searches 
in a given geographical area.219 Such authorizations, when confirmed by the 
Home Secretary, could run for renewable periods of up to 28 days.220 Once 
an authorization was in place, a police officer was permitted to stop and 
search any vehicle or pedestrian for items that could be used in connection 
with terrorism without any requirement of individualized suspicion of 
involvement in terrorist activity.221 The two appellants in Gillan, having 
been stopped and searched under these provisions, challenged their use.  
The House of Lords dismissed their appeals. The Law Lords held that 
the executive actors by the terms of the provisions had considerable latitude 
in employing this power. The House of Lords was untroubled by the 
repeated authorizations and their wide geographical scope, and found that 
the authorization and confirmation in question had been lawful.222 The Law 
Lords also ruled that the exercise of the stop and search power did not 
  
 212. A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2), [2005] UKHL 71, 
[2006] 2 A.C. 221 [8]–[9] (Lord Bingham) (appeal taken from Eng.) [hereinafter A v. 
Secretary of State (No. 2)]. 
 213. Special Immigration Appeals Commission (Procedure) Rules 2003, S.I. 
2003/1034, rule 44(3) (U.K.) [hereinafter Immigration Appeals Commission Rules]. 
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 215. A v. Secretary of State (No. 2), [2006] 2 A.C. [66] (Lord Nicholls). 
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breach the relevant ECHR rights, including Article 5 as well as Article 8, 
which affirms the right to respect for private life.223 
III.  RECONCILING THE RECENT DECISIONS WITH THE CONVENTIONAL 
ACCOUNT 
As discussed in Part I, the executive’s use of extraordinary powers 
during times of war or crisis has generally met with little judicial resistance 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. Since 9/11, despite familiar 
claims about the need for deference to the executive in matters of national 
security being made,224 this pattern does not appear to have repeated itself, 
at least not to the same extent, in the cases discussed in Part II. How can this 
phenomenon be reconciled with the conventional account of judicial 
behavior in times of war? Five possible explanations are discussed below. 
A. A Break in the Historical Pattern of Judicial Deference 
The first and most optimistic explanation from a civil libertarian 
standpoint is that there has been a break in the cycle of judicial 
acquiescence followed by post–fact regret and the resulting pattern of 
contraction and expansion of liberty. So has the post–9/11 period seen the 
emergence of judges willing to stand firm in the face of executive claims of 
national security, or in David Dyzenhaus’ terms, a “judicial ‘coalition of the 
willing’”?225 
Discussing developments in several jurisdictions, including the two 
under consideration, Eyal Benvenisti discerns a clear contrast between the 
recent crop of judicial decisions and historical judicial behavior.226 
Benvenisti argues that it is possible to now speak of a new era, where 
“executive unilateralism is being challenged by national courts in what 
could perhaps be a globally coordinated move.”227 Similarly, a number of 
  
 223. Id. at [21]–[29]. 
 224. See, e.g., A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [37] (Lord Bingham) 
(“[The Attorney General] submitted as it was for Parliament and the executive to assess the 
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state. It was not for the courts to usurp authority properly belonging elsewhere.”). See also 
infra text accompanying notes 234–236; Eyal Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy: The 
Strategic Uses of Foreign and International Law by National Courts, 102 AM. J. INT’L L. 
241, 253 (2008) [hereinafter Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy]. 
 225. David Dyzenhaus, Introduction: Legality in a Time of Emergency, 24 W.R.L.S.I. 
1, 3 (2008). Dyzenhaus himself considers it too early to draw such a conclusion. See id. 
 226. Benvenisti, Reclaiming Democracy, supra note 224, at 256. See also DAVID COLE 
& JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 264 (2007). 
 227. Eyal Benvenisti, United We Stand: National Courts Reviewing Counterterrorism 
Measures, in COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY’S CHALLENGE 251, 254 (Andrea Bianchi & 
Alexis Keller eds., 2008) [hereinafter Benvenisti, United We Stand]. 
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British commentators have highlighted the contrast between the robust 
review of the House of Lords in the Belmarsh case and the earlier case law 
exemplified by Liversidge.228 
The Supreme Court and the House of Lords have seemingly rebuffed a 
host of executive measures implemented in the name of national security 
since 9/11, so there appears to be some validity to this view. This section 
looks more closely at the support for the view that there has been a break in 
the cycle of judicial deference, and proposes several possible reasons why it 
might have occurred. 
1.  The United States 
The conventional account of judicial behavior described above would 
suggest that the Supreme Court would subject the executive branch’s post–
9/11 national security policies to minimal scrutiny. Yet the Court did not 
behave consistently with this prediction, and consistently rejected many of 
the arguments advanced by the government.  
The Supreme Court’s 2004 decisions, for example, created a number of 
obstacles for the Bush Administration. This is probably least true of the 
Padilla decision, which as noted earlier, was decided on purely procedural 
grounds.229 This decision, together with a few other procedural 
machinations, ultimately allowed the Bush Administration to avoid a 
potentially adverse Supreme Court decision.230 The other two 2004 
decisions posed more immediate problems for the Administration. Despite 
government claims that permitting judicial review would endanger national 
security,231 the majority in Rasul stymied the Bush Administration’s attempt 
  
 228. See Brice Dickson, Safe in Their Hands? Britain’s Law Lords and Human 
Rights, 26 L. STUD. 329, 339 (2006); Mary Arden, Human Rights in the Age of Terrorism, 
121 L.Q.R. 604, 616-17 (2005); KAVANAGH, supra note 6, at 219.  
 229. See Padilla, 542 U.S. 426.  
 230. Padilla duly filed his case in South Carolina, where the District Court ordered 
him released.  The Fourth Circuit overruled. In November 2005, shortly before a response to 
Padilla’s petition for a second Supreme Court hearing was due, the Bush Administration 
transferred Padilla into the civilian court system where he was later convicted at trial. Jenny 
S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror”, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 
1036–37 (2008). 
 231. In its Supreme Court brief, the Bush Administration claimed that:  
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Guantanamo detainees be granted access to counsel to maintain a habeas action would in all 
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the military’s ability to win the war, but no doubt be “highly comforting to enemies of the 
United States.”  
Brief for Respondents at 54, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (No. 03–334) (quoting 
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950)). 
30 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1 
 
to insulate Guantánamo from judicial scrutiny.232 In the Hamdi litigation, 
the Administration again made bold claims of executive exclusivity in the 
national security arena.233 Although Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion 
did not go as far as some of the other opinions,234 it rejected these claims in 
the Hamdi decision’s most quotable sound–bite.235 But the rejection was not 
merely rhetorical. In holding that Hamdi must have some ability to 
challenge his designation as an enemy combatant, Justice O’Connor 
rejected the government’s claims that no further fact-finding into the 
circumstances of Hamdi’s capture was necessary,236 and that proper respect 
for the separation of powers deprived the individual of any individual 
process.237  
In the Hamdan litigation, the government made further claims of 
executive exclusivity. Indeed, in a brief to the D.C. Circuit, the government 
asserted that the mere fact litigation was possible was a potential danger to 
national security.238 Such claims fell on deaf judicial ears in the Supreme 
Court. Hamdan was another rebuke to the Bush Administration, and 
delayed (temporarily, as it turned out) the Administration’s plans for trying 
terrorist suspects by military commission.239  
Two aspects of the decision were particularly significant. First, the 
holding that CA3 of the Geneva Conventions applied to the conflict with al 
  
 232. See Rasul, 542 U.S. 466. See Dawn E. Johnson, The Story of Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld: Trying Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
STORIES 447, 454 (Christopher H. Schroder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
 233. In the Supreme Court, the government contended that Hamdi’s status as an 
enemy combatant justified “holding him in the United States indefinitely—without formal 
charges or proceedings—unless and until it makes the determination that access to counsel or 
further process is warranted.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 510–11 (2004). The government also 
argued that “as long as a prisoner could challenge his enemy combatant designation when 
responding to interrogation during incommunicado detention he was accorded sufficient 
process to support his designation as an enemy combatant.” Id. at 540–41. 
 234. Justices Scalia and Stevens dissented and held that the detention of an American 
citizen could only be legal after a conviction for a criminal charge or where the writ of 
habeas corpus had been suspended. Id. at 554–79. Justices Souter and Ginsburg joined the 
plurality opinion so as to vacate the lower court opinion. However, they disagreed with 
Justice O’Connor’s conclusion that the AUMF impliedly authorized detention, and her 
suggestions about what might satisfy her due process framework for enemy combatants. Id. 
at 540–54. Only Justice Thomas accepted the government’s legal position in its entirety. Id. 
at 579–99. 
 235. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (“[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President 
when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s citizens.”). 
 236. Id. at 526. 
 237. Id. at 527. 
 238. See Brief for Appellants at 12, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 
2005), (No. 04–5393), available at 
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/nkk/documents/hamdan-opening-brief2.pdf (“By 
permitting captured enemies to continue their fight in our courts, the district court’s holding 
threatens to undermine the President’s power to subdue those enemies.”). 
 239. Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
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Qaeda had significant ramifications for the interrogation and treatment of 
detainees because of CA3’s prohibition on the mistreatment of detainees.240 
Second, Hamdan had wider significance because it repudiated the idea that 
the President had constitutional carte blanche in prosecuting the War on 
Terror, even in the face of constraining legislation.241 The decision thus 
reaffirmed the principle that even the President, the Commander–in–Chief 
in wartime, was constrained by law.242 
The reaction of the political branches to Hamdan, namely the MCA, set 
the stage for a further confrontation in Boumediene, where the Court ruled 
that Guantánamo detainees had the constitutional right to seek habeas 
corpus and that the MCA was an unconstitutional suspension of that right.243 
As David Cole observes, the Court defied the predictions of the 
conventional account once more: 
For the first time in its history, the Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional a law enacted by Congress and signed by the president on 
an issue of military policy in a time of armed conflict. While the Court has 
on rare occasions found that presidents exceeded their powers where they 
acted contrary to congressional will during wartime . . . this decision went 
much further, upending the joint decision of the political branches acting 
together on a military matter during a time of military conflict.244 
2.  The United Kingdom 
The contrast between the conventional account and the apparently robust 
post–9/11 stance of the House of Lords has been widely noted by academic 
commentators.245 The centerpiece of this new approach is the Belmarsh 
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Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 351, 380–81 (2010). 
 244. David Cole, Rights over Borders: Transnational Constitutionalism and 
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decision, in which a majority of eight Law Lords ruled against the 
government.246 Lord Hoffmann, in an apparent turnaround from his earlier 
paean to deference in Rehman, held that the situation faced by the United 
Kingdom was not a public emergency threatening the life of the nation, 
meaning that derogation under Article 15 of the ECHR was unjustified:  
Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of 
government or our existence as a civil community. . . . The real threat to 
the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its 
traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from 
laws such as these. That is the true measure of what terrorism may 
achieve.247 
The other seven Law Lords in the majority decided the case on the basis 
that even though derogation was justified under Article 15, the measures 
taken were not strictly required by the exigencies of the situation.248 In so 
ruling, these Law Lords proved willing to scrutinize decisions taken for the 
purposes of national security.249  
The exceptionality of the Belmarsh decision has been widely noted. It 
was, as Adam Tomkins described, “an extremely rare example of a British 
court overturning the government’s view of what was necessary in the 
interests of national security.”250 Conor Gearty expressed a similar view: 
“[t]he speeches of these eight senior judges amount collectively to what is 
  
224 (Andrea Bianchi & Alexis Keller eds., 2008). See also Fiona de Londras & Fergal F. 
Davis, Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing Perspectives on Effective 
Oversight Mechanisms, 30 O.J.L.S. 19, 41–44 (2010); Rodney C. Austin, The New 
Constitutionalism, Terrorism, and Torture, 60 C.L.P. 79, 117 (2007); IAN LEIGH & ROGER 
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(2008). 
 246. See Aileen Kavanagh, Judging the Judges Under the Human Rights Act: 
Deference, Disillusionment and the “War on Terror,” P.L. 287, 289 (2009); Benvenisti, 
United We Stand, supra note 227, at 253–54. 
 247. A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [96]–[97]. 
 248. See supra text accompanying notes 187–189. 
 249. See, e.g., A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [164] (Lord Rodger), 
[226] (Baroness Hale). See also Shah, Skirmish, supra note 185, at 416–17. 
 250. Adam Tomkins, Readings of A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
P.L. 259, 259 (2005); see also David Feldman, Proportionality and Discrimination in Anti-
Terrorism Legislation, 64 C.L.J. 271, 272 (2005) (describing the decision as unprecedented in 
that it examined “the legitimacy of measures adopted in good faith on national security 
grounds.”). Even the ultimately skeptical Keith Ewing stated that “[t]he decision is perhaps 
the most important decision since Entick v Carrington (1765), not only for the fact that the 
House of Lords stood up so convincingly to the Executive but also for their manner of doing 
so.” Keith Ewing, The Futility of the Human Rights Act – A Long Footnote, 37 BRACTON L.J. 
41, 42 (2005).  
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the finest assertion of civil liberties that has emerged from a British court 
since at least Entick v Carrington.”251 
In addition to the Belmarsh case, the House of Lords proved willing to 
scrutinize the executive on matters of national security in its decisions 
concerning control orders252 and the use of evidence obtained through 
torture.253 The outcomes of these recent War on Terror cases has led David 
Bonner to conclude that there has been a change: the historical judicial 
approach of deference in matters of national security, and being “at times 
more executive-minded than the executive,” has been consigned to the 
past.254  
3.  Causes 
David Dyzenhaus offers two explanations for the historical record of 
judicial deference during times of emergency. The first is that judges defer 
because of a lack of courage; the second is that judges defer out of 
prudence.255 If Dyzenhaus is right about this, then what has happened to this 
lack of judicial courage or excess of prudence? The next section outlines 
three related causes for this change in judicial approach. 
a. Social Learning 
Mark Tushnet argues that a political community can learn from the 
mistakes of the past through a process he terms social learning. A draconian 
policy implemented by the executive in the name of national security may 
be accepted at the time, even by the courts. However, once an emergency is 
over, the reflection that takes place after the fact comes to the conclusion 
that the policy was unjustified, and that the judicial acceptance of it was 
wrong.256 The outcome of this process is that society, and particularly its 
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See also Feldman, supra note 251, at 273 (“For all these reasons . . . the decision, perhaps the 
most powerful judicial defence of liberty since Leach v. Money (1765) 3 Burr. 1692 and 
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 254. BONNER, supra note 66, at 350.  
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 256. Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 26, at 125. 
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courts, become more circumspect over time when faced with similar 
claims.257  
Knowing that government officials in the past have exaggerated threats to 
national security or have taken actions that were ineffective with respect to 
the threats that there actually were, we have become increasingly skeptical 
about contemporary claims regarding those threats, with the effect that the 
scope of proposed government responses to threats has decreased.258 
This dynamic can be seen clearly in relation to Korematsu.259 Rather than 
lying around like a “loaded weapon” as Justice Jackson feared,260 
Korematsu instead lies around as a salutary warning to society and as a kind 
of anti–precedent for the courts.261 Several members of the current Supreme 
Court have disapproved of it.262 The Court itself has never approved  its 
result again.263 The words of Judge Marilyn Patel, who granted Korematsu’s 
writ of coram nobis and vacated his wartime conviction some forty years 
later, sum up the historical verdict on the decision: 
Korematsu remains on the pages of our legal and political history. As a 
legal precedent it is now recognized as having very limited application. As 
historical precedent it stands as a constant caution that in times of war or 
declared military necessity our institutions must be vigilant in protecting 
constitutional guarantees. It stands as a caution that in times of distress the 
shield of military necessity and national security must not be used to 
protect governmental actions from close scrutiny and accountability. It 
stands as a caution that in times of international hostility and antagonisms 
our institutions, legislative, executive and judicial, must be prepared to 
exercise their authority to protect all citizens from the petty fears and 
prejudices that are so easily aroused.264 
  
 257. Id. See also Thomas Poole, Harnessing the Power of the Past? Lord Hoffmann 
and the Belmarsh Detainees Case, 32 J.L.S. 534, 543 (2005). See Tushnet, Defending 
Korematsu?, supra note 25, at 132 (pointing out that the process of social learning may be 
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 258. Tushnet, Defending Korematsu?, supra note 25, at 126. 
 259. 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
 260. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 261. Cole, Judging the Next Emergency, supra note 4, at 2575 (“In short, Korematsu 
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Explicit (and perhaps oblique) references to Korematsu appear in some 
of the post–9/11 decisions discussed in this Article, indicating at least an 
awareness of the mistakes of history. Justice O’Connor’s Hamdi opinion 
seems to allude to Korematsu when it discusses the dangers of an 
“unchecked system of detention” in light of “history and common sense.”265 
Later in the opinion, when arguing that military needs coexist with judicial 
scrutiny, Justice O’Connor specifically cites Justice Murphy’s dissent in 
Korematsu.266 Similarly, Justice Souter’s opinion references Korematsu and 
the “cautionary example of the internments in World War II” in the course 
of discussing whether there was legal authority to detain Hamdi.267 That 
Korematsu should be cited in Hamdi is not entirely surprising given the 
broad historical parallels in the subject matter. Additionally, in a powerful 
symbolic move, Fred Korematsu himself filed an amicus brief in the Hamdi 
and Rasul cases.268 
Perhaps more surprisingly, Judge Patel’s retrospective verdict on 
Korematsu appears in a part of Lord Bingham’s Belmarsh judgment that 
discusses the importance of maintaining judicial supervision even in times 
of crisis,269 suggesting that its anti–precedential quality may not be limited 
to the United States. In addition, Lord Hoffmann’s Belmarsh judgment 
draws on similar historical lessons from closer to home:  
There have been times of great national emergency in which habeas corpus 
has been suspended and powers to detain on suspicion conferred on the 
government. It happened during the Napoleonic Wars and during both 
World Wars in the twentieth century. These powers were conferred with 
great misgiving and, in the sober light of retrospect after the emergency 
had passed, were often found to have been cruelly and unnecessarily 
exercised.270 
  
 265. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530. 
 266. Id. at 535 (“While we accord the greatest respect and consideration to the 
judgments of military authorities in matters relating to the actual prosecution of a war, and 
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In sum, the social learning thesis suggests that the more skeptical and 
non–deferential approach evident in the Supreme Court and the House of 
Lords since 9/11 is the result of the courts paying heed to the lessons of the 
past, and being conscious of the need to avoid repeating their judicial 
predecessors’ acquiescence in executive measures that later proved 
excessive. 
b. The Rise of Civil Society 
David Cole and Jules Lobel advance an explanation based on the 
existence of an increasingly strong civil society, including human rights 
groups, civil liberties groups, the domestic and foreign media, and foreign 
governments.271 Cole and Lobel argue that the actions of these entities in 
scrutinizing and criticizing aspects of American counter–terrorism policy 
have “given the courts a stronger backbone than they have ever shown in 
confronting the executive in a time of crisis on national security matters.”272 
 Many of these groups brought their views directly to the Supreme Court’s 
attention by filing amicus briefs in support of the detainees in the major 
detention cases.273 Similarly, in the United Kingdom, the human rights 
organizations Liberty and Justice have been prominent both in the public 
arena274 and as intervening parties in most of the major cases before the 
House of Lords.275  
An interesting transnational manifestation of this phenomenon is the 
criticism of detention at Guantánamo Bay by British judges both inside and 
outside the courtroom. In R(on the application of Abbasi and another) v. 
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and another,276 
the English Court of Appeal considered the situation of Abbasi, a British 
citizen detained by the United States at Guantánamo Bay. Abbasi’s lawyers 
sought to compel the British Foreign Office to take action on his behalf. 
They were unsuccessful, but the decision is notable for the message the 
Court appeared to send to its judicial brethren in the United States: 
  
 271. COLE & LOBEL, supra note 226, at 262–64. On the media more specifically, see 
Neal Devins, Talk Loudly and Carry a Small Stick: The Supreme Court and Enemy 
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 276. [2002] EWCA Civ. 1598, [2002] All E.R. 70 (Eng.). 
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The position of detainees at Guantanamo Bay is to be considered further 
by the appellate courts in the United States. It may be that the anxiety that 
we have expressed will be drawn to their attention. We wish to make it 
clear that we are only expressing an anxiety that we believe was felt by the 
[District Court] in Rasul. As is clear from our judgment, we believe that 
the United States courts have the same respect for human rights as our 
own.277 
Likewise, Lord Steyn, speaking extra–judicially at a lecture at Lincoln’s 
Inn, made a sustained critique of the detention of terrorist suspects at 
Guantánamo Bay and the plans to try certain detainees before military 
commissions. He called for the United States to live up to its professed 
values, and made none–too–subtle reminders that the eyes of the 
international community were watching.278 It was, as Dyzenhaus observes, a 
suggestion that the Supreme Court “put [its] rule–of–law house in order.”279 
The reaction of civil society since 9/11 certainly provides a marked 
contrast to the reaction to, for example, the Japanese internment in World 
War II.280 In the end, it is obviously difficult to ascertain the extent to which 
the activities of these various facets of civil society affected the judges 
concerned. But wider public awareness and scrutiny surely cannot have hurt 
the cause of litigants seeking redress from the courts.  
c. Changes in the Law 
A third cause relates to the great changes to the law that have occurred 
since World War II, particularly the development of international human 
rights and the law of armed conflict. The impact of legal change is 
especially apparent in relation to the Bush Administration’s attempts to try 
terrorist suspects by military commission. These military commissions, as 
noted earlier, were established by the Presidential Order of November 13, 
2001.281 This Order was modelled on Roosevelt’s Order that established the 
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commissions unsuccessfully challenged in Quirin.282 However, President 
Bush’s Order received much more criticism.283 Bradford Berenson, a lawyer 
in the White House at the time, later discussed the decision to follow the 
Quirin precedent: “[t]he legal foundation was very strong. F.D.R.’s [O]rder 
establishing military commissions had been upheld by the Supreme Court. 
This was almost identical. What we underestimated was the extent to which 
the culture had shifted beneath us since World War Two.”284  
Certainly, there have been major cultural changes in the sixty odd years 
since World War II, including greater skepticism of government and of 
unconstrained executive power—the consequence of events such as the 
Vietnam War and Watergate.285 Additionally, there have been developments 
in American law since World War II, including significant changes to 
constitutional criminal procedure,286 as well as courts–martial and military 
justice.287 This alone would have made the reliance upon the 1942 Quirin 
precedent a risky proposition.288 Moreover, quite apart from changes to 
American domestic law, the international legal arena also shifted (to say the 
least) over the same period of time. A large part of this shift was the post–
war establishment of the system of international human rights.289 The 
General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights in 1948.290 The Universal Declaration in turn gave rise to 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,291 and the 
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
1966.292 Of course, these three foundational treaties have since been joined 
by a plethora of other human rights instruments.  
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The basic idea of human rights, namely that people have certain 
entitlements by virtue of their humanity, has an obvious transnational 
appeal. It therefore provides an obvious normative standpoint from which to 
critique counterterrorism policy. The constituents of the civil society 
discussed earlier—(most obviously) human rights groups, the media, 
foreign governments, as well as both the English Court of Appeal in 
Abbasi293 and Lord Steyn294—have all employed the discourse of human 
rights in this way.  
Allied with the establishment and development of human rights law were 
advancements in the law of armed conflict. The end of World War II saw 
the adoption of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949,295 which have since 
gained universal acceptance.296 These were followed in 1977 by the first and 
second Additional Protocols,297 although they have not been ratified by the 
United States.298 These developments in the law, which included the 
creation of Common Article 3 and its requirement of trial before a regularly 
constituted court, proved especially important in Hamdan.299 
As far as the United Kingdom is concerned, the most important legal 
development has been the incorporation of the European Convention on 
Human Rights into the United Kingdom’s domestic law via the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (HRA).300 In the United Kingdom, legal rights were 
traditionally sourced in the common law rather than in a formal bill of 
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 294. See generally Steyn, supra note 278. 
 295. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and 
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked 
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. See generally STEPHEN NEFF, WAR 
AND THE LAW OF NATIONS 340–41 (2005). 
 296. Christopher Greenwood, Historical Development and Legal Basis, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 1, 27 (Dieter Fleck ed., 2d ed. 2008). 
 297. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, opened for signature Dec. 12, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, 
and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, opened for 
signature Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609. 
 298. The United States does, however, accept that certain Articles, such as Article 75 
of Additional Protocol I, are declaratory of customary international law. See Hamdan, 548 
U.S. at 633; William H. Taft IV, The Law of Armed Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient 
Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 322 (2003). 
 299. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630–34. See also id. at 633 (where a plurality of the Court 
found Article 75 of Additional Protocol I to be declaratory of many of the “trial protections 
that have been recognized by customary international law.”). 
 300. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.). Note that “incorporation” is a slightly 
inaccurate description, as the Act does not incorporate the entirety of the ECHR. See HELEN 
FENWICK, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 165 (4th ed. 2007). 
40 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1 
 
rights.301 This changed somewhat with the entry into force of the ECHR in 
1953,302 and the acceptance of the individual right to petition the European 
Court of Human Rights in 1966.303 However, it was not until October 2000, 
with the coming into force of the HRA, that ECHR rights became 
domestically enforceable in the United Kingdom.304  
The HRA is essentially a statutory bill of rights that provides for a soft 
form of judicial review of legislation: Section 3 of the Act requires that all 
legislation must be given effect to in a way that is consistent with the 
ECHR, “so far as it is possible to do so.”305 While the HRA was 
undoubtedly a significant constitutional development,306 the extent to which 
it has made a difference to human rights protection in the United Kingdom 
remains contested.307 The position taken here is that the HRA has made a 
difference in cases concerning national security and human rights in two 
ways. 
First, the HRA led to the establishment of a new parliamentary 
committee, the Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), which is tasked 
with reporting on human rights in the United Kingdom.308 Among its 
activities is the checking of legislation for compliance with ECHR rights. 
Consequently, since 9/11, the JCHR has issued many highly detailed reports 
on different aspects of counterterrorism law and policy. Its reports are relied 
on by other human rights groups, members of Parliament as well as the 
courts.309 Significantly, in the Belmarsh case, Lord Bingham drew upon the 
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work of the JCHR, as well as the Newton Committee, a body which had 
been set up especially to review the ATCSA.310 The support provided by the 
work of these bodies may be part of the explanation for the apparent change 
from the traditional deferential scrutiny applied in cases concerning national 
security.311 
Second, the HRA has made a difference by elevating the judiciary as an 
institution, and giving it a firm mandate to act in cases involving human 
rights.312 This is evident in Lord Bingham’s response in the Belmarsh case 
to the Attorney General’s claim that it was for the political branches to 
assess both the gravity of the threat facing the nation, and what measures 
might be appropriate in response; such issues, in the Attorney General’s 
submission, fell within the purview of the democratically elected branches 
of the state.313 Lord Bingham stated that he did not accept the full extent of 
the Attorney General’s claim: 
I do not in particular accept the distinction which he drew between 
democratic institutions and the courts. It is of course true that the judges in 
this country are not elected and are not answerable to Parliament. It is also 
of course true . . . that Parliament, the executive and the courts have 
different functions. But the function of independent judges charged to 
interpret and apply the law is universally recognised as a cardinal feature 
of the modern democratic state, a cornerstone of the rule of law itself. The 
Attorney General is fully entitled to insist on the proper limits of judicial 
authority, but he is wrong to stigmatise judicial decision-making as in 
some way undemocratic. It is particularly inappropriate in a case such as 
the present in which Parliament has expressly legislated in section 6 of the 
1998 Act to render unlawful any act of a public authority, including a 
court, incompatible with a Convention right, has required courts (in 
section 2) to take account of relevant Strasbourg jurisprudence, has (in 
section 3) required courts, so far as possible, to give effect to Convention 
rights and has conferred a right of appeal on derogation issues. . . . The 
1998 Act gives the courts a very specific, wholly democratic, mandate.314 
This suggests that the HRA has been important at the institutional level: 
by giving the courts a much stronger sense of constitutional mandate on 
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which to act, the HRA has likely contributed to the overcoming of the 
traditional judicial reluctance to act in cases concerning national security.315 
d. Executive Excesses 
Brian Simpson has described the traditional judicial attitude towards 
executive power in wartime as being subject to the “Reading Presumption 
of Executive Innocence.”316 Named for Lord Reading, this is the 
presumption that the executive “will act honestly and that its powers will be 
reasonably exercised.”317 The final cause then, is executive action that is 
sufficiently egregious to overcome this presumption. In the years after 2001, 
certain actions on the part of both the Bush Administration and the Blair 
Government may have been sufficiently egregious to make the judges 
reluctant to completely trust the good faith of the executive.  
The Bush Administration took extreme positions in habeas corpus 
litigation in an attempt to exclude the possibility of judicial scrutiny over 
the detention of terrorist suspects.318 However, the Administration’s claims 
of exclusive and unreviewable authority over detention may have been 
undermined by its own overbroad detention policy,319 particularly as more 
and more accounts of erroneous detention emerged.320 The Administration 
did not help itself by setting up the cursory Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal (CSRT) review process in the wake of the Supreme Court’s 2004 
decisions.321 Between July 30, 2004 and January 12, 2005, CSRTs 
confirmed the enemy combatant status of 520 out of 558 detainees.322 In 
practice, the combination of non-disclosure of evidence, the presumption in 
favor of the government’s evidence, and the acceptance of hearsay evidence 
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put the detainees at a great disadvantage, and reduced the CSRT process to 
a pro forma affair.323 Indeed, there is speculation that it was a highly critical 
affidavit from intelligence officer Lieutenant Colonel Stephen Abraham, 
based on his experience of the CSRT process, which led the Supreme Court 
to reverse its initial decision to refuse certiorari in Boumediene.324  
The Bush Administration’s treatment of those it detained also likely 
undermined its position before the Supreme Court. The first photographs 
from Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq became public on the evening after the 
Supreme Court had heard the cases of Hamdi and Padilla, and one week 
after Rasul had been heard.325 In the oral argument for Padilla, Justice 
Ginsburg had even questioned then–Deputy Solicitor General Clement 
about whether anything would prevent the President from authorizing 
torture. Clement replied that this was unthinkable because the executive 
branch of the United States did not do such things.326 It is hard to suppose 
that the pictures from Abu Ghraib could have been far from the Justices’ 
minds when they were considering the Bush Administration’s claims of 
exclusive executive competence in national security matters. While there is 
no express mention of Abu Ghraib in any of the 2004 decisions, portions of 
those decisions, as Jenny Martinez observes, seem to be driven by concerns 
about the coercive interrogation and mistreatment of detainees.327 Justice 
O’Connor’s Hamdi opinion, for example, contains a reference to the AUMF 
definitely not authorizing “indefinite detention for the purpose of 
interrogation.”328 Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion in Padilla is also 
unequivocal in rejecting detention for the purpose of interrogation.329 
However, Martinez contends that it was the Rasul decision that was the 
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most affected by Abu Ghraib: the majority’s facially expansive approach to 
jurisdiction was “a signal to the executive branch about the possibility of 
judicial review of interrogation practices in far-flung places.”330 
By the time Hamdan was argued in the Supreme Court in 2006, more 
damaging material was in the public domain.331 The notorious Bybee/Yoo 
memorandum had been leaked in June 2004.332 This proved to be just one of 
many memoranda documenting and justifying the use of coercive 
interrogation.333 By 2005, reports of secret CIA prisons and extraordinary 
rendition emerged.334 In December 2005, there was the revelation that 
President Bush had authorized the National Security Agency to eavesdrop 
on Americans outside the parameters prescribed by statute.335 Many of these 
policies rested upon the same expansive theory of Presidential power 
advanced in litigation by the Bush Administration. That the Supreme Court 
rejected this theory in Hamdan was thus significant, but at the same time, 
perhaps unsurprising. 
The Blair Government’s example of excess centered around the dossier 
of pre–war intelligence on Iraq that was allegedly given a “sexing up“.336 
Then–Prime Minister Tony Blair presented the information in the dossier to 
Parliament in September 2002. Among his claims were that Saddam 
Hussein had the capability to launch weapons of mass destruction in forty–
five minutes. This claim became central to Blair’s case for supporting the 
American-led Iraq war.337 The forty–five minute claim was later disavowed, 
eventually leading to a public inquiry into the intelligence on Iraq that was 
critical of the intelligence services.338 Both David Bonner and Conor Gearty 
suggest that the scandal over the intelligence on Iraq and weapons of mass 
destruction may have led to greater skepticism about the Government’s 
national security claims.339 This “fiasco” receives an explicit mention in 
Lord Hoffmann’s Belmarsh judgment.340 Lord Scott, who had some 
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familiarity with the world of intelligence,341 makes the point even more 
clearly: 
It is certainly true that the judiciary must in general defer to the 
executive’s assessment of what constitutes a threat to national security or 
to “the life of the nation”.  But judicial memories are no shorter than those 
of the public and the public have not forgotten the faulty intelligence 
assessments on the basis of which United Kingdom forces were sent to 
take part, and are still taking part, in the hostilities in Iraq.342 
B. The Conventional Account is Incorrect or Incomplete 
Some commentators have argued that, although there is a wealth of 
historical evidence that supports the conventional account, civil liberties are 
not invariably infringed during wartime, and that there have been historical 
instances of courts protecting civil liberties during times of emergency or 
perceived emergency.343 If this alternative account is correct, then there is 
less difficulty in accommodating the non–deferential decisions of the 
Supreme Court and the House of Lords since 9/11. 
However, some of the Supreme Court decisions that are said to support 
the alternative account are, for varying reasons, problematic. Some 
decisions were actually made after the war or crisis was over.344 A small 
number were decided in media res. For instance, in 1943, the Supreme 
Court took a firm stance against mandatory displays of allegiance toward 
the flag in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.345 In doing 
so, the Court overruled Minersville v. Gobitis, its own decision from just 
three years prior in which it had upheld the expulsion of Jehovah’s Witness 
children for refusing to salute the flag.346 At the time of the decision, World 
War II was certainly ongoing, but as Michal Belknap notes, the case hardly 
presented “even an apparent threat to the war effort.”347  
Then there is the canonical Korean War–era Youngstown decision, in 
which the Court ruled that President Truman’s Executive Order directing 
seizure of steel mills when confronted with the prospect of a steelworkers’ 
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strike was unconstitutional.348 Truman’s order was framed in military terms, 
and warned that a strike would hinder the war effort and thereby impair 
national security.349 That said, Youngstown did not directly concern national 
security policy as such. Alternatively, Youngstown may be an example of an 
exception to the rule, the result of a perfect storm of political and legal 
circumstances.350 
The Pentagon Papers decision, in which the Court ruled against the 
government in its attempt to enjoin the publication of a secret study on the 
involvement of the United States in Vietnam, is another possible 
exception.351 As Geoffrey Stone argues, “[i]n the Pentagon Papers decision, 
the Supreme Court, for the first time in American history, stood tall—in 
wartime—for the First Amendment.”352 At the same time, however, Stone 
acknowledges that the study was probably more an embarrassment than a 
threat to national security: it was at that time already three years old, 
concerned a prior administration’s actions, and disclosed no military 
plans.353 So once again, this decision did not represent a direct challenge to 
the executive branch’s national security policies. 
The most that could be said, as far as the United States is concerned, is 
that there is perhaps the odd anomalous decision. At most this requires a 
slight qualification of the conventional account: in wartime and during 
crises, the courts defer to the executive in the great majority of cases 
concerning national security.354 Still, the number of post–9/11 decisions that 
seem to qualify as anomalies is considerably greater than the number of 
earlier decisions that might qualify. This would suggest that other factors 
are at work. 
In the case of the United Kingdom, the pattern of historical judicial 
deference in wartime and crisis is even stronger; one struggles to find any 
historical examples of judicial resistance in national security cases,355 which 
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makes many of the decisions of the House of Lords since 9/11, such as the 
Belmarsh decision, seem even more anomalous.  
C. The Passage of Time 
As alluded to in the previous section, there are instances of the courts 
behaving in a non–deferential manner on matters of national security either 
right at the end of or after a war or crisis. This indicates that the point in 
time when a case reaches the court may be important: a challenge is most 
likely to succeed when the war or crisis is over, and normality has 
returned.356 For example, the Supreme Court’s Milligan decision is 
sometimes thought of as a landmark civil liberties decision, but it was 
decided after the Civil War had concluded, and after President Lincoln’s 
death.357  
The same pattern is discernible in Duncan v. Kahanamoku.358 Martial 
law had persisted in Hawaii for three years until President Roosevelt 
revoked it in 1944. Martial law had included the trial of civilians before 
military tribunals. The Court observed that although the Hawaiian Organic 
Act, on which the government relied, permitted the Governor to invoke 
martial law, there was no explicit legislative authorization to close the 
civilian courts and supplant them with military tribunals for an extended 
period.359 Accordingly, a majority of the Court ruled that the trials 
complained of were illegal, and the imprisoned civilians were entitled to be 
released.360 But the case was only argued at the end of 1945; the Court’s 
decision was only made after martial law had already been ended and after 
the war was over. The answer might have been different had the case come 
before the Court during the war.361 
By contrast, Quirin was argued in July 1942. This was during the Battle 
of the Atlantic, when German U–boats were attacking American sailors and 
merchantmen in American waters.362 Similarly, the internments in the 
United Kingdom under Regulation 18B occurred in the middle of 1940, a 
period when France was falling to the Nazis and Britain was being bombed 
on a nightly basis.363 Liversidge v. Anderson was heard in September of 
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1941, and decided two months later.364 At that time, Europe was in the 
hands of Nazi Germany, which had recently invaded Russia.365 The United 
States had yet to join the war. 
However, the passage of time is not always a guarantee of success. The 
Court’s decisions concerning allegedly subversive speech in World War I 
were decided after the war’s conclusion.366 Similarly, Korematsu was 
argued in October 1944 and decided two months later.367 Although World 
War II had not yet concluded—even putting aside evidence that indicates 
the military had long known that there was no real threat to the West Coast 
of the United States368—by late 1944, Japanese forces had certainly long 
lost the initiative in the Pacific Theatre.  
The recent decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords indicate 
that timing may still be an important factor. By the time that cases worked 
their way up to the highest courts, more and more time had passed since the 
initial shock of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. This made the context in which 
those cases were decided more like Milligan and Duncan, and less like 
Quirin and Liversidge. Peter Spiro makes this point in relation to the 
Supreme Court’s Hamdan decision: 
The putative boldness of the Court’s action in Hamdan might also be 
discounted by the context in which it was decided. Query whether the case 
counts as a wartime decision. The administration’s aggressive 
characterizations notwithstanding, in the absence of another major terrorist 
attack (post-9/11), the perception of an acute threat may have subsided.369 
Thus, in the relative safety and calm of early 2006,370 the Court could 
afford to be more confident in asserting itself. 371 The same logic applies to 
the 2004 decisions, which were decided a little under three years after the 
9/11 attacks. Had they reached the Court earlier, and been decided closer to 
9/11, their outcomes might well have been different.372  
The same observation can be made about the House of Lords. The 
Rehman decision, in which a number of Law Lords expressed the view that 
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national security was the prerogative of the executive,373 came out the 
month after 9/11. One year later, in October 2002, the English Court of 
Appeal ruled in favor of the government in the Belmarsh case.374 At the 
time, there was an expectation of further terrorist attacks.375 As it turned out, 
by the time the House of Lords decided the Belmarsh case, some two years 
later, there had been at that point been no further attacks.376 Conversely, the 
terrorist bombings in London of July 2005 would surely have been in the 
minds of the Law Lords when they were deciding the Torture case later that 
same year.377 Indeed, the stricter standard of proof insisted upon by the 
majority in that decision may reflect a concern not to unnecessarily hamper 
the executive’s ability to protect national security.378  
D. Qualitative Differences Between Traditional War and the War on 
Terror 
The fourth explanation why judges may be acting in a less deferential 
manner is because they perceive the War on Terror to be something other 
than a war or crisis. The first difference that could be drawn is one about the 
quality of the threat. Bruce Ackerman, for example, contrasts a physical 
threat to a population with a threat to a polity. He contends that terrorism, 
unlike the threats faced during World War II and the Civil War, poses a 
physical threat to populations, but not to the continued existence of 
government.379 
A similar view is evident near the conclusion of Lord Hoffmann’s 
judgment in the Belmarsh case. Lord Hoffmann was alone in concluding 
that derogation from the ECHR was unjustified because there was not a 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation. Lord Hoffmann drew a 
distinction between the predicament faced by the United Kingdom in the 
dark days of early World War II and threat it faced from al Qaeda: 
This is a nation which has been tested in adversity, which has survived 
physical destruction and catastrophic loss of life. I do not underestimate 
the ability of fanatical groups of terrorists to kill and destroy, but they do 
not threaten the life of the nation. Whether we would survive Hitler hung 
  
 373.  See Rehman, [2001] UKHL 47, [2003] 1 A.C. 153. 
 374. A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2002] EWCA Civ. 1502 
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in the balance, but there is no doubt that we shall survive Al-Qaeda. The 
Spanish people have not said that what happened in Madrid, hideous crime 
as it was, threatened the life of their nation. Their legendary pride would 
not allow it. Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our 
institutions of government or our existence as a civil community.380 
Related to this is the debate about whether the War on Terror can 
sensibly be conceived of as a war. Some have argued that the War on Terror 
is a constructed (and bad) idea,381 but the War on Terror paradigm continues 
to have purchase.382 But even if one accepts that the War on Terror is 
properly considered a real war rather than a metaphorical one, it looks like a 
different kind of war. In earlier conflicts such as the two World Wars, the 
nation as a whole felt it was at war. A larger proportion of the population 
was directly affected in some way, for example by serving in the armed 
forces, or working in war-related industries. There was conscription, 
rationing of food, and other forms of domestic sacrifice.383 By contrast, for 
the vast majority of the population today, life goes on as before the 9/11 
attacks.384   
The War on Terror also differs from earlier wars in some other 
significant respects. Unlike past wars, there are for the most part no armies 
massing on battlefields; indeed there are no clear distinctions between the 
battlefield and non–battlefield.385 Most significantly, the War on Terror has 
no obvious end. Historically, courts have been unwilling to rule on when a 
war has ended for legal purposes, and thus when executive war powers 
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cease to operate.386 In the War on Terror, there will probably not even be an 
event that can be marked as the date the war factually ended.387  
Most obviously, these differences may have affected how the Supreme 
Court viewed the executive’s detention decisions. There is plainly a much 
lower risk of wrongfully detaining a uniformed German soldier captured on 
a battlefield in Normandy than a terrorist suspect captured in civilian 
clothing in Pakistan. The prospect of wrongful detention lasting for 
potentially a captive’s lifetime adds to the stakes.388 
More generally, the prospect of an indefinite war on terror lasting for 
generations renders the dichotomy between war/crisis and peace/normality 
inadequate.389 Michael Rosenfeld proposes a useful intermediate category 
between the two poles by drawing a distinction between times of crisis and 
times of stress.390 Times of crisis involve some kind of threat to the 
existence of the state, and may have multiple causes, including war. Such 
times are to be contrasted with ordinary times. Somewhere in the middle of 
the spectrum are times of stress. There is of course overlap between times of 
crisis and stress, but the less acute and more diffuse and long–term a threat 
is, the more likely that it will cause a period of stress. If a threat is severe 
and occurs in a short space of time, it will probably cause a period of 
crisis.391 In terms of Rosenfeld’s tripartite framework, the War on Terror 
amounts to “conditions of stress” rather than crisis.392  
If the Supreme Court and House of Lords considered the post–9/11 
period to be a period of stress rather than crisis associated with traditional 
war, then this makes the generally non-deferential approach more 
explicable. The clearest indication of this appears in Justice Kennedy’s 
Boumediene opinion: 
Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of limited duration, 
it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined. 
If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for 
years to come, the Court might not have this luxury.393  
  
 386. See Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948). See also R v. Bottrill ex parte 
Kuechenmeister [1947] 1 K.B. 41 (Eng.). 
 387. Michael Rosenfeld, Judicial Balancing in Times of Stress, in 
COUNTERTERRORISM: DEMOCRACY’S CHALLENGE 357, 392 (Andrea Bianchi & Alexis Keller 
eds., 2008) (“Whereas conventional wars are generally limited in duration, the war on terror 
must be conceived as a war without end.”). 
 388. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2238 (“[T]he consequence of error may be detention 
of persons for the duration of hostilities that may last a generation or more . . . [the risk of 
error] is a risk too significant to ignore.”).  
 389. See GROSS & AOLÁIN , supra note 357, at 174–80. 
 390. Rosenfeld, supra note 391, at 359. 
 391. Id.  
 392. Id. at 357. See also Mark Tushnet, Emergencies and the Idea of 
Constitutionalism, in THE CONSTITUTION IN WARTIME 39, 45 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2005). 
 393. Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2277. 
52 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1 
 
Put simply, the courts have not deferred to the executive in the way that 
they have in past wars and crises because they perceive the War on Terror 
as being a prolonged and indefinite period of stress—something other than a 
war or crisis—thus justifying a different approach. 
E. Less than Meets the Eye: Continued Judicial Deference?  
The final explanation is the most pessimistic from a civil libertarian 
standpoint. This is that the break in the historical pattern of deference in 
wartime or crisis has been at least partially misdiagnosed in two ways. First, 
the decisions that are said to herald a new dawn of judicial assertiveness 
almost exclusively concern detention. The picture becomes more ambiguous 
once decisions concerning other aspects of the War on Terror are 
considered.394 Second, even some of the lauded decisions of the Supreme 
Court and House of Lords have had less impact than often claimed, and 
have aspects that are more accommodating to the needs of the executive 
than might first appear. 
The Supreme Court’s Iqbal decision illustrates the first point.395 In ruling 
as it did, the Court makes it difficult for persons like Iqbal to seek redress. 
The decision itself turns on Iqbal’s allegations against Ashcroft and Mueller 
being implausible. That is, it is implausible to suppose that in the aftermath 
of the 9/11 attacks, Iqbal’s detention and alleged mistreatment were the 
result of instructions from above. This is, to say the least, a charitably 
trusting attitude.396 
The Supreme Court’s detention decisions illustrate the second point. 
These decisions certainly had some effect upon the Executive, and they 
were typically portrayed as being setbacks for the Bush Administration.397 
But the Bush Administration’s claims were often so extreme that the Court 
even hearing the case was essentially a setback, regardless of how the Court 
ruled.398  
Moreover, not all forms of judicial intervention are created equal. 
Judicial intervention may involve a court inquiring into whether the 
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executive has the legal authority to act in the way it has, or it may involve a 
court considering whether the executive has acted in accordance with 
substantive legal and constitutional principles.399 Most of the Supreme 
Court’s decisions, which were based on separation of powers principles, the 
absence of congressional authorization,400 or other process–based points, fall 
into the first category.401 The Court’s decisions have thus tended to impose 
certain broad boundaries, but leave the details to be worked out by the lower 
courts or the executive.  
In Hamdi, a majority of the Court accepted that there was sufficiently 
clear legal authorization for detaining Hamdi in the form of the AUMF. A 
different majority held, however, that Hamdi was entitled to more of an 
opportunity to challenge his designation as an enemy combatant.402 But 
beyond that, there was little guidance that other than Justice O’Connor’s 
skeletal due process framework that formed the basis for the CSRTs.403 
Rasul was also a narrow decision in that it only established that the courts 
had the statutory jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from Guantánamo 
detainees; the courthouse door, in other words, was open, only to be shut 
again when the habeas statute was subsequently amended.404 Rasul raised, 
but did not resolve, other questions, such as whether its holding applied to 
terrorist suspects held by the United States outside of Guantánamo.405 The 
decision also said little about the substantive claims detainees might raise, 
leaving only a tantalizing hint in the last footnote of the majority opinion.406 
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Similarly, although Hamdan invalidated the Bush Administration’s 
military commissions, and held that CA3 of the Geneva Conventions 
applied to the conflict with al Qaeda, the decision primarily turns on the 
lack of proper congressional authorization, a point that comes through 
particularly clearly in Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion.407 Accordingly, 
in the wake of Hamdan, the Bush Administration quickly made plans to 
have Congress enact a statutory regime that would authorize revised 
military commissions and limit the scope of the Court’s ruling on CA3. The 
result was the MCA, which largely cancelled out the decision.408  
Even Boumediene was ultimately about a question of process: whether 
detainees at Guantánamo had the constitutional right to seek habeas 
corpus.409 As with the other decisions, the Court left open questions of 
substance, such as the class of person legitimately subject to detention, and 
questions of implementation.410 The consequence has been continuing 
uncertainty about key issues related to detention at Guantánamo, even after 
more than eight years and several Supreme Court decisions.411 
Munaf follows this pattern of process over substance. The decision 
affirms the right of two citizens detained without trial to seek habeas 
corpus.412 Indeed this point does not turn on Munaf and Omar’s citizenship. 
However, the Court’s munificence here is immediately followed by a denial 
of relief across the board, and a notably deferential attitude with respect to 
Munaf and Omar’s claims that they might face torture in Iraqi custody.413  
In the case of the British judiciary, Conor Gearty observes that the 
judges, aside from the odd exceptional decision, have continued their 
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pattern of deference in cases involving national security.414 Certainly this is 
true of the House of Lords’ decisions of Rehman,415 with its calls for 
deference to the expertise of the Home Secretary on the issue of national 
security,416 Gillan,417 with its apparent comfort with the repeated exercise of 
an exceptional power encompassing a wide geographical area in response to 
an amorphous terrorist threat,418 and RB,419 with its acceptance of the 
practice of obtaining diplomatic assurances from states with dubious human 
rights records to facilitate the deportation of terrorist suspects.420 
As with the Supreme Court’s detention decisions, Gearty’s exceptions to 
the rule, which include the Belmarsh and Torture decisions, become more 
ambiguous upon closer inspection. The question in the Torture case,421 the 
admissibility of evidence procured through torture carried out by a third 
party, arose because SIAC’s procedural rules allowed it to receive evidence 
that would not be admissible in court.422 There was no express mention of 
torture in either the rules or their authorizing statute. Absent express 
statutory authorization, the House of Lords was unwilling to allow SIAC to 
receive such evidence. As Lord Rodger put it, “the revulsion against torture 
is so deeply ingrained in our law that . . . a court could receive statements 
obtained by its use only where this was authorised by express words, or 
perhaps the plainest possible implication, in a statute.”423 But under the 
Westminster system, nothing stops Parliament from legislating express 
words overriding the exclusionary rule against torture. So, like Hamdan, the 
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Torture case could be said to turn on the absence of legislative 
authorization.  
Moreover, the majority prescribed a strict standard of proof to be met 
before the exclusionary rule applied.424 The difficulty in satisfying the 
majority standard limits the practical effect of this decision, and renders the 
unanimous rejection of evidence obtained through torture largely symbolic, 
a holding with more bark than bite.425 Viewed in this light, the Torture 
decision starts looking less like an exception, and more like an instance of 
disguised judicial deference.426  
Even the flagship decision representing the changed attitude of the 
House of Lords, the Belmarsh case,427 is more deferential than it might 
initially appear to be. In his submissions to the Court, the Attorney General 
reiterated the familiar position that decisions about national security were 
rightly the province of the political branches,428 an argument to which the 
House of Lords had historically been receptive.429 On the question of 
whether there was a public emergency threatening the life of the nation that 
justified derogation, most of the Law Lords stayed true to the historical 
pattern of deference.430 It was only in relation to the question of whether the 
measures taken in response to the emergency were appropriate that the 
House of Lords could be said to have broken with historical precedent. 
There is an element of inconsistency in the two positions that were 
adopted by most of the Law Lords.431 Logically, expressing a view about the 
appropriateness of measures taken in response to an emergency required 
some kind of assessment as to the nature of the emergency itself. It may be 
the case that the facts of the Belmarsh case were simply sui generis: the 
measures taken in this case had such obvious flaws—applying only to non-
citizens, and being easily circumvented by voluntary departure432—that 
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whatever view one took of the emergency, these measures were not strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation. 
A further point made by some commentators about the Belmarsh case is 
that it was followed by the establishment of the control order regime, and 
thus did not change much. As Joo–Cheong Tham and Keith Ewing argue: 
[B]y accepting that there [was] a national security threat on the most 
gentle standards of review, the House of Lords [gave] the green light to 
legislation almost as offensive to human rights as that which was declared 
incompatible with the European Convention, in the form of control 
orders.433 
As noted earlier, the House of Lords does not have the power to strike 
down legislation, but merely has the power to declare a statute incompatible 
with rights in the ECHR.434 Thus, the Belmarsh decision only declared that 
the ATCSA detention scheme was incompatible with the relevant articles of 
the ECHR. The decision about whether to repeal Part 4 of ATCSA remained 
with the political branches.435 The decision effectively ended the ATCSA 
detention scheme, but it did so because the scheme became politically, 
rather than legally, untenable.436  
It is true that the PTA’s control order regime, which replaced the 
ATCSA detention scheme, was a careful response to the Belmarsh decision, 
particularly those portions where some of the Law Lords had suggested that 
lesser measures, such as electronic tagging and restrictions on travel and 
communications, would be a better way of responding to the terrorist 
threat.437  
As for the House of Lords’ control order decisions, they arguably flatter 
to deceive as well.438 The JJ decision was in a sense a loss for the 
Government.439 But the PTA’s control order regime itself survived largely 
unscathed, and the House of Lords arguably gave an implicit endorsement 
  
 433. Joo-Cheong Tham & K. D. Ewing, Limitations of a Charter of Rights in the Age 
of Counter-Terrorism, 31 MELB. UNIV. L. REV. 462, 493 (2007). See also Adam Tomkins, 
The Rule of Law in Blair’s Britain, 26 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 255, 287 (2007). 
 434. Human Rights Act, 1998 § 4 (U.K.). 
 435. See DYZENHAUS, supra note 4, at 33 (“[T]he fact that a decision under the 
Human Rights Act declares an incompatibility between a provision in a statute with human 
rights commitments without invalidating the provision can be seen as letting the judges off 
the hook.”). 
 436. See Walker, Keeping Control, supra note 190, at 1407–08. 
 437. See A v. Secretary of State (No. 1), [2005] 2 A.C. [35] (Lord Bingham), [155] 
(Lord Scott). Indeed, Thomas Poole argues that the Blair Government took parts of a 
decision that ruled against it, and used it to construct “its revamped, non-discriminatory (but 
still decidedly illiberal) counter-terrorist policy.” See Poole, supra note 311, at 271. 
 438. See generally Tham & Ewing, Continuing Futility, supra note 307. But cf. 
Kavanagh, supra note 246, at 294–95. 
 439. See generally Secretary of State for the Home Department v. JJ, [2007] UKHL 
45. 
58 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1 
 
to the system subject to only a few minor modifications.440 All that JJ 
required was a reduction in the particular control orders’ period of curfew. 
The Government relied particularly on Lord Brown’s stated tipping point of 
sixteen hours,441 and adjusted various control orders accordingly—some 
from twelve to sixteen hours, and some from eighteen to sixteen hours.442  
The same critique can be made of the Article 6 control order decisions. 
In MB,443 the majority recognized that in certain cases—notably those where 
the key allegations against the controlee were contained solely in the 
undisclosed material—the provision of a special advocate might not be 
sufficient to satisfy Article 6.444 But rather than declaring the scheme 
incompatible with Article 6, the majority instead adopted an interpretative 
solution via Section 3 of the HRA.445 This eventually necessitated the 
follow–up decision of AF, which clarified that Article 6 required a certain 
minimum level of disclosure of the case against the controlee.446 But once 
again, both decisions could be said to be mere tinkering around the margins 
of the control order regime. 
IV. A CONFLUENCE OF EXPLANATIONS 
As ever, it is a combination of the proffered explanations that best 
explains the post–9/11 decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords. 
The explanation that the conventional account of judicial behavior in times 
of war is incorrect or incomplete can largely be discounted. Although there 
are some decisions that support this view, many of these decisions, as 
discussed earlier, amount to judicial courage after the fact or are only 
loosely related to national security policy.447 Many more decisions, 
especially those from the United Kingdom, are more consistent with the 
conventional account.  
This then suggests that other forces are at work. The point in time when 
these cases were heard and decided is relevant. The Supreme Court’s first 
decisions were decided close to three years after the 9/11 attacks. Hamdan 
and Boumediene were decided even later. The House of Lords’ first 
decision in the immediate period after 9/11 was Rehman; the robust defence 
of liberty in Belmarsh was more than three years away.448 However, the 
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same point might have been made of Korematsu, heard and decided in late 
1944, more than two years after the internment had begun, and with the 
United States militarily ascendant. Similarly, Iqbal and RB are among the 
decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords most distant in time 
from 2001. 
Another explanation for the greater judicial assertiveness is simply that 
the courts perceive the War on Terror to be different from a war or crisis. 
Lord Hoffmann’s dissent in the Belmarsh case, for example, expresses the 
view that the threat of transnational terrorism does not equate with previous 
wartime threats. Further, the War on Terror differs from traditional wars in 
other ways, notably in terms of its potentially indefinite duration. 
Accordingly, the courts may see the War on Terror as being a prolonged 
period of stress, rather than a war or crisis, and thus not necessarily afford 
the executive the same measure of deference.449 That said, the outcomes of 
the decisions in Dennis450 and GCHQ,451 both decided during a period of 
stress in the form of the Cold War, point to the relevance of the two 
remaining explanations, which are essentially competing narratives about 
the significance and impact of the War on Terror decisions of the Supreme 
Court and House of Lords. 
There is something to be said for the view that post–9/11 decisions such 
as Hamdi, Rasul, Hamdan, and Belmarsh represent a break from the past.452 
These cases contain various references to historical judicial deference to 
excessive security measures implemented by the executive, and are 
suggestive of a process of social learning.453 Additionally, there has been the 
growth of a civil society—including advocacy groups, the media, and 
foreign governments—that has provided the courts the extra backing and 
cover that was not there to the same extent previously.454 There have also 
been great legal changes in the past sixty years, including the establishment 
of international human rights law and the modernization of the law of armed 
conflict. These developments not only provided a framework and 
terminology by which to evaluate and critique counterterrorism policies, but 
also constrained the freedom of the respective executives. This is true of the 
Bush Administration’s plans to try terrorist suspects by military 
commission, and of the Blair Government’s various schemes to detain 
terrorist suspects. In the case of the United Kingdom, the enactment of the 
HRA merits further mention. Although it would be too simple to state that 
the HRA changed everything, the Act was significant in that it elevated the 
House of Lords’ perception of its institutional role and constitutional 
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mandate.455 Finally, executive actions that were perceived as being 
excessive may have undermined in the eyes of judges the claim that the 
executive is uniquely competent in national security matters.456 
At the same time, decisions such as Munaf, Iqbal, Gillan, and RB are 
generally consistent with the conventional account. Moreover, while the 
bulk of the post–9/11 decisions may represent a change from the historical 
pattern, their impact should not be overstated. Decisions such as Rasul and 
Hamdan, for example, turned on the interpretation of statutes. The Supreme 
Court’s adverse interpretations in those cases were obstacles that were 
quickly overcome by a largely compliant Congress. Hamdi confirmed the 
executive’s power to detain certain individuals as enemy combatants, 
subject to observing a modicum of due process.  
For all the force of the House of Lords’ rejection of the use of tortured 
evidence in the Torture case, the standard of proof required makes the 
decision’s impact perhaps more rhetorical than real. For all the praise 
heaped upon the Belmarsh decision, the House of Lords did obligingly 
accept the existence of an emergency. Additionally, the Court declared one 
detention scheme incompatible with the ECHR, only for the government to 
enact another scheme that still raises significant human rights concerns. And 
so far, the House of Lords has only chipped away at the edges of the control 
order regime.457  
However, given the centrality of Parliamentary sovereignty in the United 
Kingdom’s constitutional arrangements and the consequent limitations on 
judicial review, it is hard to criticize the House of Lords for not doing more; 
the decision to create the control order regime was after all made by the 
political branches.458 In any case, this chipping away has some real effects, 
namely incentivizing prosecution and reducing reliance on control orders.459 
Indeed, given the reluctance of the executive to disclose sensitive material, 
the AF case may presage the end of the control order system.460 
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CONCLUSION 
In all likelihood, the truth lies somewhere in between the last two 
explanations discussed in the previous part. In the main, the decisions of the 
Supreme Court and the House of Lords since 9/11 exhibit a degree of 
deference in relation to matters of national security that is inconsistent with 
the conventional account. But by the same token, these decisions are not 
always the dramatic and unambiguous rebukes to the executive branch that 
they are sometimes portrayed to be.  
It should also be borne in mind that most of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions deal with counterterrorism policy embarked on during the early 
days of the War on Terror: all the decisions bar one in some way concern 
the Bush Administration’s claims of exclusive authority to detain or try 
terrorist suspects without judicial oversight.461 These were extreme cases.462 
By contrast, the House of Lords has heard a wider variety of cases. It has 
been most willing to closely scrutinize cases involving indefinite detention 
and control orders, but less willing in cases involving other aspects of the 
War on Terror.463 For this reason also, it is in the end better to describe the 
post–9/11 decisions of the Supreme Court and House of Lords not as 
leading to a break in the cyclical pattern of contraction and expansion of 
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